Yesterday Medco offered itself up to smaller competitor Express Scripts, creating an entity with more than 50% of the PBM market. PBMs originated as specialized claims processors that supposedly were able to reduce drug costs. But in the 1990s drug costs soared. Somehow PBMs didn’t lose employer clients, further confirming that employers are dumb about how they buy health care. Most employers didn’t understand that PBMs made much of their profits on rebates they were paid by drug companies to keep particular drugs on formulary. Almost none of that money went back to the employer. After that game ended, PBMs replaced almost all those profits by making huge margins on generics until Walmart showed that it could make a profit by charging only $4 a fill. Now it looks like extracting a bigger piece of the pie from pharmacies and charging more to employers may be the only game left for PBMs. And that’s probably the driver behind the merger.
Deficit talks & phone hacking
Over at Managed Care Matters Joe Paduda makes the outrageous allegation that because the current Republican leadership all voted for the Medicare Modernization Act, (not to mention our adventure in the desert and the tax cuts last decade) they bear some responsibility for the current deficit. One wonders why the Democrats aren’t using this information and explaining it to the public instead of bending over and grabbing both ankles/adopting a position to the right of average Republicans! I’ve now figured it out. Joe must have obtained this information by phone hacking and because it was obtained illegally, Obama and co are honor bound not to use it!
The Federal Exchange–Lost in alternate history
The next few days will be all about exchanges, or more accurately the “American Health Benefit Exchanges for Individuals and Small Business Health Options Program.” Tim Jost has a long and excellent article at Health Affairs blog explaining them, and–Yikes!–it’s the first of three. There’s going to be different rules for individuals versus small businesses, and of course differences as to whether Medicaid plans (which will cover more poor individuals) will be part of the exchange. For states that decide not to implement the exchange themselves, it’ll be done by the Feds–assuming that the whole thing doesn’t get repealed (and it won’t). But I remain very concerned that the complexity of 50 different exchanges, not to mention the ability of HHS to really keep an eye on all of them, is a problem–one that would be much reduced with a single Federal Exchange looking something like FEBHP. As Jost says, The Senate version of the ACA which became law (in contrast to the House version which did not) creates the exchanges at the state rather than the federal level. For that we have Scotty Brown and the voters of Massachusetts to blame. And thus the weirdness of the American political system has given us a long series of headaches for years to come.
Interview: Insurance exchanges, ACOs? ACS tells you how…
We’ve been digging under the hood a little of Xerox since (much to my surprise) they started sponsoring THCB recently. The reason Xerox cares about health care is related to their purchase of ACS a couple of years back. ACS was best known for government (mostly Medicaid) claims processing but they also had a whole lot of other technologies and capabilities. One of those is actually running the Health Insurance Exchanges that are going to be in every state (or imposed on the states in 2013 if they’re not ready). Another ACS capability is working with incipient ACOs, or providers that backdoor into ACOs via Medicare Advantage or direct deals with private plans.
Last month I spoke with Michael Sandwith who runs Market Management at ACS. Why should a state or a provider use ACS to put the systems together to run health information exchanges or ACO information capture and management systems? Mike’s logic is simple–because they’ve done it before. They’re operating 7 state HIEs already and aren’t just bringing Powerpoint. And can ACOs work given the failure of PHOs in the 1990s? It all depends if we can independently manage the physicians within the system–i.e. don’t let the hospital management screw it up! Here’s the full video interview of someone who’s been there in two of the bigger health care IT challenges of the day.
What an exchange needs to do
HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (who sat in front of me at a meeting last month–my brush with fame) is in the HuffPo writing about the benefits of the (coming) health insurance exchanges. I’m deeply disappointed that we ended up with state-based exchanges rather than the national exchange that was in the House version of the ACA, but I’ll spare you my diatribe on what States and the Senate are good for….Instead let’s focus on what the exchanges will need to do. Deliver accurate information about insurance choices to their users. That means real apples to apples comparisons of benefits, networks, out of pocket costs, etc, etc. This is all still buried on most private markets (e.g. HealthInsurance still doesn’t clearly explain max out of pocket costs–the most important number for most policies). The good news is that there won’t be any distinction between the polices sold to different business sizes and to sick and healthy people. The bad news is that when people see how little their subsidy will buy them, and that most plans will have high deductibles, the good news may get lost. But the exchanges are important advances–even if in some states they may get subverted.
Western PA fight to the finish?
For a long time Pittsburgh’s UPMC has been flexing its market power and there’s been precious little that dominant local insurer Highmark Blues could do about it. UPMC has long been accused of similar tactics to Partners in Boston and Sutter in Northern California–facing down local insurers, forcing them to pay higher prices than paid to other systems, and using aggressive tactics to crowd out competitors. Highmark has reacted by trying to keep competitors alive, and finally has gone the whole hog and bought West Penn Alleghany the only other viable hospital system in the area. It’s likely that UPMC will end its contract with Highmark when it expires next year, and we’ll see the first in a new round of battles for market share between systems. But it surely won’t be the last across the nation as more and more hospitals will fight to fill the capacity they’re building by acquiring market share. I suspect the end won’t be pretty.
Why we need an independent health data utility
By MATTHEW HOLT
This is another in the numerous “death of Google Health” stories that have been appearing since Friday when the Google blog announced the pulling of the plug. I must admit to being more than a little pissed off with Larry Page or whomever it was within Google that made the decision. After all, Google Health was only introduced a tad more than 3 years ago (premiered at HIMSS in Feb 2008; launched officially later that year). And just nine months ago they hired a new product manager and debuted some interesting new features connecting to the new wave of personal sensors. I know that Wall Street has been telling Google to focus on fewer products and that Page as new CEO has decided to do that but for a company as rich as Google the effort involved in keeping Google Health alive would be trivial. And props here to our friends at Microsoft who are integrating HealthVault into their wider health care business.
The sunsetting of Google Health has meant an outpouring of articles from the factual (Deb Linton at Health 2.0 News), to the historical (John Moore at Chilmark) to the winners/losers assessment (Fred Trotter) to the mega-quotes including mine (Marshall Kirkpatrick at ReadWriteWeb). There’s also been a steady stream of both sad and (sadly) happy people commenting on the Society for Participatory Medicine listserv, and Mr HISTalk was his cynical self–basically saying that tech know-nothings should stay out of our complicated health care business. He’s wrong and now Google is wrong, and here’s why.
With the very notable exception of HealthVault and (hopefully) some new innovation from Dossia, we are now dependent on a number of small companies to maintain the emerging data utility layer. The data utility layer in health is the place that is going to collectively store all the data that is being generated. Apparently Google didn’t have the real patience for two rapid developments.
First, with a combination of the Direct Project and the stipulation in the meaningful use regulations that EHR users share data with other providers and with patients, individuals are going to find that more and more data about themselves is available and easily accessible. Whether or not it’s a Farmville-type hit, the ability to capture all that information in one place is very important. Currently it’s also very time consuming to put together so very few people do it. But I do know of instances where people have laboriously entered lab values into Google Health just to store them. Sooner rather than later that data will be available much more easily in machine readable format, and as those barriers to use fall so the desire to look at that data will increase.
Pawlenty sounding Bush-like on health care
AHIP is in town (as in San Francisco) and sadly that means I’m juggling the office and conference going. So altough I made the odd party I missed former Minnesota governor Tim Pawlenty (who apparently was paid $30K to speak). However, Politico’s Kate Nocera seems to think he got a bit of a tough reception from the insurer crowd which by and large is going to enjoy the ACA and has set its course on making hay from it. But whether or not repealing ACOs and the experiments with Medicare financing are really going to happen (and they’re not) I was though struck by the final quote about exchanges: ‘And Pawlenty dismissed the importance of the state exchanges the law will create to provide consumer choice. “We already have an exchange: It’s called the free market,” Pawlenty said.’ Pawlenty shows himself to be a complete idiot on the Mark Pauly scale here. (Pauly is the Wharton professor who thinks that the individual insurance market works fine because it’s more or less OK for 80% of the people in it). But doesn’t this remind you of another not-too-bright former Republican governor? Remember who said this in 2007?: “I mean, people have access to health care in America. After all, you just go to an emergency room.” Let’s hope for logic’s sake alone we don’t end up with Pawlenty in the White House, as it could be a repeat of 2001-8 all over again.
Agreeing with Michael Cannon on Medicaid, somewhat
Michael Cannon from Cato doesn’t like the idea that we’re going to cover children by putting them into Medicaid. To tell the truth I don’t like it either. He points to a NEJM study that shows–in the no shit, Sherlock department–that Medicaid recipients wait longer for care. My guess is that Michael’s solution is to a) do nothing or b) give Medicaid recipients a fund to pay for their own care–a fund that real life shows us will be cut as soon as budgets get tight (and as has happened nation-wide under S-CHIP). My solution is to put those kids in the same system as everyone else. But the real politics of the US is that–for now–Medicaid expansion is the best we’re getting. As soon as it’s done we should be working to abolish Medicaid by integrating it into a rational single system so that children (and adults) do not get discriminated against in medical care simply because they chose their parents poorly.
Caregivers: The Advocate and the Adminstrator
Just thought that I’d share this photo taken by @drjmob at the Partnership for Patients meeting today. (P4P is a safety initiative kicked off by HHS a few weeks back). Here’s patient data advocate (and BFF of Health 2.0) Regina Holiday getting to grips with CMS head Don Berwick. In fact they had remarkably similar experiences with spouses who endured terrible hospitalizations made worse by incomplete data and poor provider team communication. Here’s Regina’s story from her blog and here’s Don’s (starts on Page 20 of Escape Fire but read the whole thing if you haven’t before). It’s an unlikely couple–the pre-school teacher without a college degree and the Harvard policy wonk. But they share a human experience both are working hard to eradicate.
