By SETH JOSEPH

This is part 3 of Seth’s series about Epic that has generated much interest and a little controversy and we are happy to host it on THCB. Part 1 and Part 2 were published on Forbes earlier this year.

According to people in the room, Judy Faulkner’s vision on stage at Epic’s 2022 User Group Meeting was epic, in the grandest sense of the word. 

The company, which had grown as a unified clinical and billing EHR system, was now laying out a roadmap in which it would be the digital front door for all things consumer facing. A massive panoply of capabilities including, according to Epic’s own subsequent documentation, customer relationship management, provider finders and online scheduling, online check-in, patient financial experience, and many others. 

Core to enabling all of this was shifting how patients interact with MyChart, the patient-facing application that allows individuals to access their health records. 

Historically, each MyChart account was ‘tethered’ between an individual and a hospital system and represented a simple portal for the individual to view her records. If an individual had been seen at multiple different hospital systems, then she would have multiple separate MyChart “instances”, or entirely separate accounts and logins. 

Now, Epic would ‘stitch together’ the health records and data from different hospitals on behalf of the individual in advancing what colloquially has been called Epic’s ‘national MyChart strategy’, and enable robust new functionality, creating compelling network effects between consumers and hospitals.

There were only a few problems with Epic’s strategy: first, many customers weren’t asking Epic to develop these capabilities; second, there were startups and incumbents already providing many of these capabilities; and third, the company was in a race with a federal agency, which was pushing for open standards and access that threatened Epic’s plans. 

But for a company that had slowly and steadily become the dominant health technology player, whose staff meetings for a period ended half-jokingly on a slide with the words “World Domination” on them, these problems were all fixable. 

The Promise Of Consumer Empowerment Tools

As modern history has demonstrated time and again, the ability to own or control the consumer entry point for technology can be a strategic advantage. Apple’s sleek product designs, user experience and tight ecosystem enable it to extract 30% of app developer revenues seeking to reach Apple’s users. Google’s dominance in search has positioned it to be the entryway to the internet for billions of consumers regardless of their ultimate destination, resulting in extraordinary revenue growth and profitability. 

In healthcare, the ability to meaningfully engage consumers through technology has long held promise of solving intractable problems, while also potentially positioning the firm that figures out how to do so as a new locus of power, similarly as Apple and Google above. Triaging care options for consumers, navigating them to lower cost services, facilitating payments, and providing modern convenience options are just a few of the hundreds of use cases that consumer-facing technology holds.

Key questions facing the firms seeking to find healthcare’s holy grail are how best to do this and where to start, as consumer habits and sentiment toward healthcare has proven challenging for tech companies to figure out. 

For instance, tech giants Microsoft and Google had both placed significant bets on ushering a new era of consumer empowerment in the late-2000s, with Microsoft HealthVault and Google Health. Known as patient health records (PHR), the two companies sought to enable consumers to access, aggregate, store and potentially share their health records. 

In retrospect, Microsoft and Google’s efforts were perhaps a bit too early, as both initiatives were shut down in the early 2010s, before an ecosystem of health technology adoption, connectivity and capabilities that could have feasibly supported their vision. And before consumers had a compelling reason to change their own use of technology to engage in their healthcare.

By 2022, however, the ecosystem had arrived. After the EHR Incentive program, more than 90% of doctors and hospitals had EHRs. The Covid-19 pandemic drove rapid adoption of telehealth by both physicians and consumers. Approximately $100 billion in venture capital had flowed into health technology innovation. New price transparency policies were shedding sunlight into formerly opaque and labyrinthine contracting practices. The 21st Century Cures Act put teeth into driving interoperability, introducing information blocking as a civil penalty with million dollar fines. One industry group published a report titled “Unbundling Epic: How The EHR Market Is Being Disrupted.” This author proclaimed The EHR Is Dead.

If the EHR was dead or being disrupted, then every EHR company needed a survival plan.

Epic’s Fear And Unfair Advantage

According to one hospital executive, it was this backdrop that concerned Epic’s leadership: with a rapid influx of new players and a shifting balance of power, Epic might be relegated to “just being the pipes” while others capitalized on new opportunities. Given the company’s rigid belief – proven correct time and time again – that it alone would deliver the best results for its customers and consumers, Epic thought such an outcome would be a disaster. 

To combat this risk, Epic by mid-2022 had a new strategy with MyChart and network effects at the heart of it.