Categories

Above the Fold

INTERNATIONAL/PHYSICIANS: Canadian doctors going home means the US sucks, n’est-ce pas?

This one I find hilarious and gives me great deal of personal satisfaction. The pro-American health care system, "it’s the finest on earth crowd" goes on and on about how terrible the Canadian system is and how all the doctors are leaving. In fact it was that sentiment especially from the wonderful, but confused, Sydney Smith over at Medpundit that inspired my "Oh Canada" tome.  (Actually I re-read "Oh Canada" the other day and it’s a pretty damn good piece of analysis if I say so myself).

Syd was basically saying that all the doctors were leaving cos they hated the clinical restrictions of the single payer system and wanted to move to the glorious homeland of free-choice medical practice and CABGs for 97 year olds. I showed pretty conclusively using actual real life data that a) very few doctors were leaving Canada for the US, and that b) if they were leaving it wasn’t that surprising as they get paid about twice as much by sneaking below the 49th parallel.

Well now we have more actual statistics and real data that shows that more Canadian doctors are heading back to Canada than are leaving — and this was in 2004 when hockey was on strike so there was no real reason to go to Canada! The numbers are:

Canada has seen more doctors returning than leaving for the first time in 30 years, a report by the Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) shows. The report, released Wednesday, says that between 2000 and 2004,the number of physicians leaving Canada declined by 38 percent. In 2004, 317 physicians returned to Canada and 262 left. That was a drop from 2000, when 420 doctors left the country and a significant decrease from the peak of 771 physicians who moved abroad in 1994.

I’m looking forward to the barrage of articles from the know-it all alleged "free-market" crowd who get spoon-fed rubbish by Frasier, PRI, Manhattan et al offering their apologies to the Canadians and admitting that their system is better than the one down here.  After all the alleged rush of Canadian doctors to the US was absolute proof in their mind that the reverse was true.

I’m waiting, I’m waiting….

POLICY: Gladwell on Moral Hazard, with UPDATE

Go read Malcolm Gladwell on Moral Hazard in the New Yorker.

Gladwell basically thinks that there’s some moral imperative on the part of the political right to promote user fees at the point of care and that it’s uniquely American.  The bit about it being uniquely American is not quite right, in that I first heard the term from a Japanese health ministry official explaining why they had (very low) user fees in Japan, and in the UK there have been user fees for Rx forever. But there’s no question that we have more of them here. The wise Canadians Evans and Barer list user fees at the point of care as one of their Zombies — bad health care ideas that won’t die. Their interpretation of the RAND study is succinct and correct:

Contrary to the rhetoric, the RAND evidence demonstrated clearly that patients could not discriminate between necessary and unnecessary services. User fees were as likely to deter important health-preserving or enhancing care, as “frivolous” abuse. Moreover, the deterrent effects of user charges bear more heavily upon those with lower incomes, as this group is more sensitive to increases in price. In fact, low-income persons reduced use of care that was judged by researchers to be highly effective more frequently than did their higher-income counterparts.

They go on to note that user fees at the point of care are not designed to reduce overall health care costs — after all here in the US we lead the league in both categories. Instead they’re designed by providers to try to spike their incomes. Remember that as it’ll be important later….

Gladwell of course acknowledges all that and realizes that the "actuarial" model of health insurance that is being promoted by the HSA and its backers (Hi Ron!) is designed to basically to allow those with the greatest ability to get out of paying for those with the greatest need. Of course social insurance is based on the idea of transferring resources from those who have them to those who need them. In fact there’s nothing wrong with the idea at all and if you look at Americans when they’re surveyed about it, by and large they agree.  Those of you who read my recent article on Why Hillarycare Failed may remember that Harris got the following answers on the subject in 2003:

By 75% to 21% (including a 66% to 30% majority of Republicans), most people agree that "people who are unemployed or poor should be able to get the same amount and quality of medical services as people who have good jobs and are paying substantial taxes".

By 69% to 27% (including a 63% to 32% majority of Republicans), most people disagree that "it’s fair that people who pay more in taxes (or in health insurance premiums) should be able to get better medical care than those who pay little or nothing."

But despite the fact that apparently Americans prefer the concept of social insurance, Gladwell doesn’t really come up with an explanation for why the HSA legislation has done so well, other than the primacy of ideas. He makes a lot of the influence of Mark Pauly. Pauly is a complete idiot respected health economist at Wharton, who earnestly believes both that the individual market works well for 80% of the people forced to be in it and is therefore OK, and that the reason we spend so much money on health care in America is a result of the fact that the rest of our economy is so dang efficient. (Both in serious studies published in Health Affairs — I shit you not). And his article on moral hazard is supposed to be the most influential ever published in the health policy literature, and that’s why the right has bought into it.

Of course those of us in the reality-based as opposed to faith/idea-based world think that there may be a couple of other reasons other than the strenght of ideas as to why the HSA is so popular amongst the right, and why they want to spread it to all programs including Medicare.

The first is purely political. The two big government programs of Medicare and Social Security are very, very popular and identified correctly with Democrats. There is a strong element (e.g. Grover Norquist and the WSJ Editorial pages) in today’s Republican party which wants to destroy those programs, or at least eliminate the middle classes’ dependency on them, so that their recipients are less likely to identify with Democrats and less likely to elect them to power. Electing Democrats to power of course interferes with those Republicans’ view of the real mission of government, which apparently is to plunder the treasury and hand out massive rewards to favored interests in the oil, defense, mining, pharmaceutical, etc, etc, industries, and ensure that the ultra-rich don’t have to pay much or any tax. These Republicans see the vast army of baby boomers heading towards Social Security and Medicare as a huge threat to their political future, and rightly so. Putting all Social Security and Medicare into private accounts, and as a side issue removing the social insurance aspect of those programs, is a political solution to breaking what they believe to be (what’s left of) a political machine-like dependency of the middle-class seniors on the Democrats. And I’m not convinced they’re wrong about that.

The other reason is of course much more basic and is to do purely with money. What creating tax-free HSAs does is to enable insurance companies to sell highly underwritten and incredibly profitable high-deductible insurance policies. HSAs and MSAs were developed by small insurance companies to incentivize the sale of high-deductible plans which cream-skim way healthy people from the big managed care companies. Golden Rule, run by loony Rooney, almost invented this category on its own, and massively funded Gingrich and the VRWC all the way through the 1990s. See this Mother Jones article on Rooney and Golden Rule in 1996 and one from 2004 on their success in getting HSAs through in the Medicare legislation.

Incidentally the AMA and America’s doctors also started supporting HSAs because they thought it would enable them to get out from under their PPO and managed care contracts and charge their patients directly (and get more money, as Evans and Barer suggested earlier). Unfortunately for the doctors, now that Wellpoint, United et al have taken over the game, the high-deductible plans of now and the future will have the same negotiated contracts, the same confusion over who owes what, and will just change their office managers from chasing health insurers for big lump sum payments to chasing patients for tiny ones instead. Tough break, guys.

Meanwhile, back to the insurance side. The big insurance companies went down the managed care path in the 1990s because both they thought that they would get the continued support of the employers to beat up on the providers (which they didn’t when the economy got better) and because they thought that Hillarycare would put everyone into big pools. Big pools are of course the world where managed care plans come from and they destroy the advantage of the smaller insurers — their ability to underwrite on an individual patient basis. As it turned out the big guys were wrong (slightly in part because of what the HIAA and Golden Rule’s money did to the Clinton Plan), and anyone who knows the story of the Aetna turnaround can see that it was by adopting much tougher underwriting that Aetna became the profit machine it now is. Imitation is not though the most sincere form of flattery, not when United Healthcare showed its admiration by buying Golden Rule for $900 odd million in 2003 and making loony Rooney even richer and even more able to spread his money around wacko-political operations.

Gladwell, however, fails to explain why putting HSAs into a social insurance program like Medicare is the beginning of the end for the program, and if you read the THCB comments section you’ll see plenty of information from Ron about how HSAs are all sweetness, light, and crumbly candy bars.  So — hopefully once and for all — I’ll explain why they are not. This will involve numbers, so pay attention.

Let’s assume that Medicare has 100 people in it. Let’s also assume that it costs $5,000 per person. (I’m using the $5,000 number because it’s practically identical to the numbers and in the same ratio that Ron Grenier used when he tried to sell me a policy yesterday before he found that he can’t in California, so we know they’re correct for high-deductible plans). So in the HSA dreamtime world each of our 100 seniors gets $2500 in an HSA account, and then the remaining $2,500 goes into a pool totalling $250,000 which will pay for the care of anyone who’s individual expenditures exceed $2,500. Now you need to know something about population health costs. They roughly follow the 80/20 rule, in that 80% of the money gets spent on 20% of the population. So in our 100 person Medicare, 80 people need $100,000 worth of care, while 20 need $400,000 worth of care.

Here’s the maths problem that no one on the HSA-backing side will admit to. The 80 people spending $1,250 each are fine and happy and have a further $1,250 left in their accounts. The 20 sicker people have spent their full $2,500 each and in total need a further $350,000 from the pool to pay for their care. But there’s only $250,000 in the pool because the rest of it is in the HSA accounts of the healthy 80. So now we have to make up the extra $100,000. So we can increase taxes, and spend $600,000 to provide $500,000 worth of care — not too likely to be popular (although something like that happened in Medicare managed care in the 1990s). Or we can pay providers less money for caring for the sick. Or we can look to the sickies to come up with the extra. Or we can not provide them with that care.

Any which way you look at this, we are essentially starting down the track of destroying the social insurance nature of Medicare, and the willingness of providers to take part in it. We’ve basically already done it with every other form of health insurance with the exception of the unionized, large employer market, and so in the commercial market the HSA/high-deductible plan looks similar but better than what’s already available. Unless of course you are sick, and then you run into those nasty underwriting trends because, guess what, insuring sick people breaks a pool financially — even if it’s a private-sector high-deductible underwriting pool. Which is why Golden Rule, Aetna and the rest don’t do it much any more.

And although Gladwell doesn’t seem to quite get the politics, the incentives or the mechanism, he does understand the overall impact.

The issue about what to do with the health-care system is sometimes presented as a technical argument about the merits of one kind of coverage over another or as an ideological argument about socialized versus private medicine. It is, instead, about a few very simple questions. Do you think that this kind of redistribution of risk is a good idea? Do you think that people whose genes predispose them to depression or cancer, or whose poverty complicates asthma or diabetes, or who get hit by a drunk driver, or who have to keep their mouths closed because their teeth are rotting ought to bear a greater share of the costs of their health care than those of us who are lucky enough to escape such misfortunes? In the rest of the industrialized world, it is assumed that the more equally and widely the burdens of illness are shared, the better off the population as a whole is likely to be. The reason the United States has forty-five million people without coverage is that its health-care policy is in the hands of people who disagree, and who regard health insurance not as the solution but as the problem.

I agree with the sentiment, but I though prefer the language of this great American hero who described essentially the same problem in 1945.

No, but you . . . you . . . you’re thinking of this place all wrong. As if I had the money back in a safe. The money’s not here. Your money’s in Joe’s house . . .(to one of the men). . . right next to yours. And in the Kennedy house, and Mrs. Macklin’s house, and a hundred others. Why, you’re lending them the money to build, and then, they’re going to pay it back to you as best they can. Now what are you going to do? Foreclose on them?

Apparently we’re all leaving Bedford Falls and going to live in PottersVille.

POLICY: Klein on Gladwell on moral hazard

Ezra Klein beat me to a post on Malcolm Gladwell’s piece on Moral Hazard in the New Yorker. I’ll be back tomorrow to explain why if you cross-breed him with Jill Quadagno, you about get to the right answer.

Go read Ezra’s take. He kinda agrees with Gladwell on the ideas thing.  I think there’s a little more to it than that.

PHARMA: John Mack on Merck

In an email to the Pharma Marketing list-serv, John Mack said rather more eloquently what I was trying to say at the end of my most recent post:

Another message that this jury sent was: Don’t bury us in scientific/medical jargon. Make it easy for consumers to understand the facts.

But the science was actually beside the point as far as this jury was concerned. They felt that Merck lied or held back important information and did so to protect sales (Merck was incriminated by its own memos!). Someone has to be held accountable for that — this is the main message the jury sent.

The industry doesn’t get this message. All the analysis and talk from pharma execs is about how this is going to make pharma companies more cautious in developing drugs for general health conditions in the future. They’re changing their story that all drugs are risky and patients need to understand that to most drugs are too risky for us to develop in the first place. The execs who are saying this may be listening only to their lawyers, which is a shame.

The pharma industry needs to LISTEN TO ITS CUSTOMERS and really put patients first and be transparent and not cover up the truth or twist results from clinical trials (e.g., changing the endpoint to produce more favorable outcome results) and not dodge questions from docs to protect sales.

John has more to say over on his blog about what went wrong for Merck, in an article called Jury as Focus Group (although at $253m that’s one hell of an expensive focus group!). We both believe that greater transparency about the risks and rewards of pharmaceuticals will be good for everyone in the long run.

PHARMA: WSJ on how Merck lost

I know many of you don’t have WSJ access, but the article this morning on how the Vioxx trial was run is really eye-opening. I’ll re-quote liberally.  First off, how important was all the science? Pretty key given that Ernst did not die from a heart attack or maybe not even a clot but definitely had arrythmia.  What did the jury think? Apparently that didn’t matter too much.

But the Texas verdict — and the way the jurors reached it — offers a worrisome harbinger. Merck argued that Vioxx couldn’t have caused Mr. Ernst’s death because, according to his death certificate, he died of an arrhythmia or irregular heartbeat, not a heart attack. While scientific evidence suggests Vioxx can promote blood clots leading to a heart attack, no data have linked the drug with arrhythmias.

Jurors who voted against Merck said much of the science sailed right over their heads. "Whenever Merck was up there, it was like wah, wah, wah," said juror John Ostrom, imitating the sounds Charlie Brown’s teacher makes in the television cartoon. "We didn’t know what the heck they were talking about."

As they assembled around a rectangular wooden table in the jury room, the question of causality — did Vioxx kill Mr. Ernst? — caused little trouble for the jurors. The coroner who did the autopsy of Mr. Ernst testified he could have had a blood clot that caused a heart attack but disappeared by the time of the autopsy. That would explain why the death certificate only mentioned arrhythmia.

So what is it that a jury will look at?  Perhaps it’s the behavior of the company–you remember Dodgeball?

In interviews, jurors expressed anger and mistrust toward Merck. "If I could say it in one word: hiding," said Mr. Chizer, 43, who works at the Social Security Administration. "Every time a question was asked, any one of [the Merck] witnesses circumvented the questions by going somewhere else. Just give us a straight answer."

David Webb, 20, cited a letter Merck sent to doctors around the country including Mr. Ernst’s doctor. Mr. Webb felt it buried information about potential cardiovascular risks. "Who knows, what if they had put the right information and Dr. Wallace had picked up the phone and called Bob Ernst and told him?" he asks.

And was the senior leadership taking the whole thing seriously enough?

Mr. Ostrom, 49, who has a business remodeling homes, was also disturbed that former Merck Chief Executive Raymond Gilmartin and another top Merck official gave videotaped testimony but weren’t in the courtroom. "The big guys didn’t show up," said Mr. Ostrom. "That didn’t sit well with me. Most definitely an admission of guilt."

William G. Bowen, an outside director at Merck who is on the board’s executive committee, said in future trials the company will seek better ways "to make basic scientific points as simple as possible." He also said the company may put different people on the witness stand although no decision has been made about Mr. Gilmartin’s testimony. A spokesman for the Merck defense team said taped depositions are common in trials. Mr. Gilmartin’s deposition "demonstrated that Merck’s decisions with respect to Vioxx were based on the science and in the best interest of patients," the spokesman said in a statement.

And then there’s the theatrics of a great trial lawyer, and Lanier appears to be very good, and also highly highly prepared (if not quite as "prepared" as Gene Hackman in The Runaway Jury)

In the Vioxx trial, Mr. Lanier paid a group of local citizens, matched to the jury’s demographics, to sit in the courtroom as shadow jurors and give him feedback on the effectiveness of his arguments. The shadow jurors, who made $125 a day, weren’t told who they were working for. Mr. Lanier flew in a PowerPoint expert from California to help him prepare a visual presentation for his closing argument. And he retained Lisa Blue, a psychologist and highly regarded litigator with Baron & Budd, Dallas, to watch the reactions of the real jury as the case unfolded.

From the beginning, Mr. Lanier showed his theatrical flair, speaking loudly and gesturing while roaming the courtroom as if it were a stage. PowerPoint slides in his opening statement portrayed Merck as an automated-teller machine giving cash to executives. Merck’s marketing arm was depicted as a bulldozer that would push sales at any cost.

He had workers wheel 157 boxes of paper into the courtroom to show how Merck had inundated the Food and Drug Administration with documents that obscured Vioxx’s problems. He finally stopped when Merck lawyer Gerry Lowry objected that the stack obstructed her view of the jury. Mr. Lanier set two trophies Mr. Ernst won for participating in marathons on the witness stand as Mrs. Ernst recounted the day he died. A huge portrait of the couple on their wedding day faced the jury on a large screen.

Mr. Lanier’s shadow jury met each night at a McDonald’s, providing feedback to a consultant about the progress of the trial. Last Monday, two days before closing arguments, the jurors deliberated for more than four hours and provided Mr. Lanier with an early verdict: 9 to 4 in his favor — with $115 million in damages. That wasn’t good enough. The real 12-person jury would have to vote 10 to 2 for a decision to be valid.

In a strategy meeting held the same evening, Mr. Lanier got a candid assessment from Ms. Blue, the adviser who was watching the real jury. "Four or five are really strong followers" for the plaintiff, she told Mr. Lanier, while "two or three are very bad for us."

She told him that on the issue of whether Merck failed to warn the public about the risks of Vioxx, his case was "good and tight." But that wouldn’t matter if the jurors weren’t convinced that Vioxx was the culprit. "You’re weak on causation," Ms. Blue told him.

She advised him to press hard on "cause" in his closing statement and to stress that the jury only needed to be 51% sure Vioxx was a cause of Mr. Ernst’s death. The 51% figure was a way of describing the legal requirement that there be a "preponderance of evidence" in the plaintiff’s favor. "Write [51%] on the board twice: Arrhythmia is a cardiovascular event," she instructed him. "That gets you there."

She also urged him to be humble, to play up his role as a Baptist preacher and even to suggest to jurors they might get notoriety if they voted for him. One juror, Ms. Blas, had written in her questionnaire that she loves the Oprah Winfrey show and tapes it. "This jury believes they’re going to get on Oprah," Ms. Blue told Mr. Lanier. "They only get on Oprah if they vote for the plaintiff."

Two days later, facing the jury with his final argument, Mr. Lanier kept to his plan. He advised jurors that 51% confidence in Vioxx as a cause of death was good enough. He sprinkled the speech with biblical references, at one point using the tale of Esther to urge the jurors to do the right thing even if they were fearful. And he hammered home the point that they would be sending a message that would be heard widely. "I can’t promise Oprah," he said, but "there are going to be a lot of people who’ll want to know how you had the courage to do it."

The verdict came in with punitive damages of $229m apparently estimated at the amount Merck estimated that it stood to lose "if new cardiovascular risk information on Vioxx’s label were to become effective in October 2001 instead of February 2002."  Actually punitive damages aren’t really allowed in Texas, but they are in plenty of other places….and jurors tend to be pissed when they’re told to assess them and then find that they can’t be awarded. Quite why Ernst was worth $24m I don’t know and it seems to me somewhat unlikely that the Vioxx killed him, but this is clearly not over for Merck or other big pharma companies.

So here’s my suggestion to big pharma.  Be open about the science and be open about the risks as well as the benefits of the products you’re selling.  Think of the longer term.  I still believe that if you give consumers the full facts some people will choose a "risky" product for what they perceive to be a good shorter-term benefit. But if you’re perceived as bamboozling the FDA and the public, and your marketing operation is clearly trying to hide defects, you are in the long run only hurting yourselves. And worse you’re leading to a general distrust of all the science behind pharmaceuticals and medicine.  And this country already has enough people who don’t believe in science.

PHARMA: Merck gets PR makeover at opportune time?

You know that this is one of those things that’s just an unfortunate coincidence, but the headline in my in-box says that "Merck Hires B-M to Rebuild Image". B-M is Burson-Marsteller, a huge PR agency and part of the WPP Group that Merck is using for advertising too. But I just had to laugh when given what happened on Friday, this is dated Saturday 20th August and they say this:

Although Merck remains embroiled in the after-effects of the high- profile global recall of arthritis drug Vioxx, the company insists the campaign has been in development for more than two years.

You know this press release was in the works for some time, and you just have to laugh at the serendipity of it coming out straight after the verdict goes the wrong way.

TECH: Open source EMRs — how open is open? And will it matter?

cAt the most excellent HISTalk blog, there’s an interview with Scott Shreeve, Medsphere Co-Founder and Chief Medical Officer. Now MrHISTalk has once again got one up on THCB as when I was due to interview Scott (or was it his brother Steve?) at TEPR, he didn’t show up — at least not in the 5 minutes window I gave him before I wondered onto the next booth! But what’s clear is that the enthusiasm of his account of how Medspehere is creating a cheap hospital EMR based on VistA has at least somewhat won over MrHISTalk, a man known for his somewhat cynical account of the likelihood of open source actually getting anywhere in health care. You should absolutely read that interview, which incidentally as much as anything really shows that MrHISTalk knows his stuff and does his homework.

On the other hand I’ve also been corresponding with another true believer, Fred Trotter, who is responsible for the FreeB open source billing system. The Medsphere guys seem to be sidestepping the question of whether they are going to put their version of the VistA code back into the open source domain. And Fred seems suspicious that they will not. I hope to have Fred (and hopefully others involved in this discussion too) writing for THCB shortly, but in the meantime go check out Fred’s credo and think about whether the radical open source philosophy he espouses is a good fit for health care, and/or whether Medsphere’s reworking of VistA is the answer for smaller hospitals, and who gets all this stuff to the small practices who really need it.

Finally, you may have noticed that I didn’t answer the question I posed in this post’s title. But for those of you who are concerned as to why this stuff matters read Joe Kraus’ (Excite founder and former dangerous 4×4 driver at the Stanford Ski lodge) article on the relative costs of working with Linux and proprietary formats. Just think about the real impact of a ten-fold reduction in IT costs in the next ten years.

test poll

<a href ="http://www.polldaddy.com" >web surveys</a> – <a href ="http://www.polldaddy.com/p/202358/" >Take Our Poll</a>

PHARMA: Brutal news for Merck

The jury in the first Vioxx trial has found Merck liable for the death of the patient by arrhythmia. Merck had to fight this one as it didn’t even seem to be the kind of heart disease that those people who did get heart disease in the VIGOR and other studies died from.  But they lost, and the jury awarded $253.4m.  Where they got the .4 from I’m not sure, but that’s a hell of a lot of punitive damages.  Guess that "Dodgeball" memo was pretty expensive in the end.

So if you play out the math there are an alleged 56,000 deaths from Vioxx. So if every 4 death’s costs Merck  $1 billion, then they owe some 14 trillion dollars.  That somewhat exceeds the gross national income of the country, so perhaps this amount might be reduced on appeal!

Mrk1yr But either way the recovery that Merck stock’s had since Vioxx was pulled last year is absolutely over for now. And it’ll probably be headed lower than today’s close (as usual wish that I’d bought some put options as they were expiring today!)

Here’s today’s action. Mrktoday Not exactly pretty.

assetto corsa mods