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QUALITY/PHARMA: Someone’s going to get fired at the DEA for sure

The WSJ writes about a serious scientific study of the hallucinogen in magic mushrooms.  As you might expect virtually all of the participants thought that the sessions had a very powerful effect and 60% of the clinical trial participants said that effect was very positive indeed. But 30% of the cases felt incredibly bad effects, largely increasing paranoia. That’s not much of a surprise—people react differently to different drugs. The researchers are interested in seeing if these drugs (and presumably others like MDMA/Ecstasy) have value in treating psychiatric cases.

What’s amazing is that someone in the DEA signed off and allowed this research. After all, this is a substances banned for hysterical political reasons and, like LSD its synthetic equivalent, no one is pretending that they’re not very powerful. Of course the government does allow equally powerful psychotropic drugs to be widely used and dispensed with a false pretense that somehow their use is morally different.

The main differentiator is of course what the government will allow to go through clinical trials. Now that an approved trial of one class of banned drugs that may have a positive effect has been allowed, how can the DEA justify the continued delays in granting permissions for real trials of another banned drug that we all know has significant medicinal qualities? They can’t justify it morally or rationally or even legally, but they certainly continue to raid medical marijuana dispensaries to justify their existence, their power and their budgets. So when word gets out that someone inside the DEA made a rational decision on allowing a study that counters the drug warriors’ propaganda—well, I’m sure their career is on the outs.

POLICY/QUALITY: Reclaiming the right to die; book review by Mitchell Berger

Mitchell Berger volunteered to write a review of  William Colby’s, Unplugged: Reclaiming Our Right To Die in America (2006, American Management Association, 272 pp., $24.95 hardcover), and an excellent review it is too:

High-profile legal cases such as those involving Karen Ann Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan and Terri Schiavo and their families coupled with improvements in medical technology have forced growing numbers of patients and their family members, health care providers, judges, lawyers and legislators to confront difficult end-of-life dilemmas. Because of his own background as an attorney for the Cruzan family for four years, supporter of the hospice movement and contributor to the 1990 Patient Self-Determination Act, which requires hospitals to inform patients in writing about health care advance directives such as living wills, attorney William Colby, author of Unplugged: Reclaiming Our Right to Die in America, brings unique insights to his discussion of these cases, evolving medical technology and the overarching issue of end-of-life care in America.

Colby’s book includes an extensive discussion of the Quinlan, Cruzan and Schiavo cases. He describes how relatively recent advances in scientific knowledge, such as an improved understanding of brain function, brain death and vegetative states and advances such as cardiac defibrillators, artificial respirators, feeding tubes, percutaneous endocscopic gastronomy (PEG) tubes (a method of providing nourishment to patients using a tube inserted through an endoscopic procedure which is simpler than standard feeding tube insertion), have led to new challenges as society struggles to reconcile the benefits of these technologies with respect for the individual’s quality of life and right to live and die in a manner reflecting their beliefs. Colby devotes an entire chapter of his book to explaining the ethical and medical issues associated with feeding tubes and PEG; he explains how PEG tubes, originally intended for pediatric patients, are now used routinely in cognitively impaired elderly persons who can no longer eat on their own.

While many people would want every reasonable measure taken to prolong and maintain their life regardless of their condition, many others would not want to live in a state where they are no longer able to respond to their loved ones and the world around them. When Nancy Cruzan, then a 25-year old Missouri woman, was left in a persistent vegetative state following a car wreck in 1983, her father authorized insertion of a feeding tube. Colby explains that in a persistent vegetative state a patient may be awake and even smile or move their eyes, however these movements are completely involuntary and in fact the patient has “no thinking, no feeling, no consciousness” (p. 10). When it became clear as first months and then years went by that Nancy Cruzan would never recover from her condition, Cruzan’s family tried to act on their shared “belief that  [she] would want the feeding tube removed” (p. 89). After many years of legal proceedings both in Missouri and at the federal level, including a U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1990, the family eventually was granted the right to remove the feeding tube based on evidence of what Nancy Cruzan herself would have wanted. Extensive publicity surrounded this case – indeed the Cruzan family allowed PBS’ Frontline to document their experiences — and Colby describes how the Cruzan family’s experience altered public opinion about end-of-life care both in Missouri and elsewhere and encouraged Missouri Senator John Danforth and others to sponsor the Patient Self-Determination Act.

In perhaps the most interesting portion of his book (Chapters 1-3), Colby provides an informative and balanced discussion of the most recent and perhaps controversial end-of-life care case involving Terri Schiavo. Unlike Nancy Cruzan’s family, Schiavo’s relatives were bitterly divided about what she would have wanted and what was best for her. Colby discusses his own approach to death and dying issues and even includes his own health care power of attorney as an example for others (Chapter 10; Appendix). However, he also notes the limitations of laws and legal documents. For instance, Colby describes the “institutional glide path” which dictates that many hospital patients will receive “aggressive,” often unwanted end-of-life medical care; the “glide path” reflects the tendency of health care providers and institutions to treat patients in customary, technology-intensive ways due to such factors as medical education, institutional culture and fear of litigation.

To help ensure that the end-of-life care we receive reflects our values and desires, Colby emphasizes the importance of talking at length with family members, friends and health care providers about how we would want to be cared for if our capacity to make our own decisions should ever be impaired by illness or injury. This dialogue will help ensure that our family members and health providers are not forced to confront complex dilemmas in tense and emotional circumstances with their loved one’s wishes unclear.

Colby is a strong supporter of hospice as one option for end-of-life care. Indeed, he serves as a Senior Fellow of the National Hospice and Palliative Care Organization in Washington, D.C., and the foreword to his book is contributed by that organization’s chief executive officer. He explains the rise of hospice care, which he characterizes as a “hidden jewel,” and notes that growing numbers of patients are opting for hospice (750000 of 2.5 million Americans who died in 2005). Hospice emphasizes communication between patients, families and health care providers, symptom relief and palliative care (Chapter 15).

Though he clearly has strong opinions, Colby’s book is fair and even-handed in his treatment of the major legal and ethical issues and he includes chapters devoted to concerns about expanded recognition of the “right to die” expressed by religious organizations and persons with disabilities. The book is well-researched and well-documented, with numerous end notes, citations to outside sources, suggestions for further reading and contact information for such relevant organizations as the National Family Caregivers Association and National Institute on Aging. Overall, Colby’s book provides readers with excellent background about the key legal and scientific issues, good ideas for how to approach end-of-life care and strong motivation for initiating these sometimes awkward but critically important conversations with family members and health care providers.

POLICY: An Outcomes Primer by Eric Novack

THCB welcomes back regular contributor Dr. Eric Novack, who has something to say about outcomes as well as some recent snide comments made about orthopedic surgeons by a certain other poster on the site. In addition to blogging for THCB in his (oh so rare) free time, Eric is also the host of The Eric Novack show, which airs every Sunday on KKNT 960 AM in Phoenix. You can find an archive of his recent shows here.   

An Outcomes Primer

By ERIC NOVACK M.D.

Many in medicine view those of us in orthopedics as the ‘dumb bone doctors’Sd2 (or, according to the IV, much worse than that). Much of this stems from the basic idea that fracture care, or broken bone treatment, seems very straight-forward. Oh, but wait…

So here is a brief sense of how difficult it can be to evaluate outcomes even in the ‘simple’ area of a broken wrist. And, how it can be absurd to make the surgeon completely responsible?

The first question we need to ask is, “what outcome are we measuring”? Are
we going to look at (a) has the bone healed? (b) how ‘good’ does the
xray look- i.e. how close to ‘perfect’ are the bones lined up? (c) how
is the patient’s function, and at what point after injury do you
measure- months, years?

THCB is big on functional outcomes, so let’s just say that we care about wrist function 1 year after injury. But what kind of function? Range of motion? Return to work? Return to sports?

I’ll
make it easy and say we’ll leave that to the patient and simply ask
about satisfaction with ability to return to pre-injury functioning.

Stick
with me- I know we are looking at the easy area of a broken bone. So,
we are trying to determine functional outcomes 1 year after a wrist
fracture.

Here is one way to look at the factors impacting the outcome:

1. Patient
factors – age, motivation to get better, willingness to listen to
medical advice and follow recommendations, nutritional status, other
medical conditions, previous injuries, secondary gain issues (workers’
comp, lawsuits), body’s response to injury (i.e. inflammatory response
to trauma)

2. Injury factors—severity of injury force (e.g. trip
over dog vs. 60mph motorcycle crash), location of fracture (e.g.
involving joint cartilage), degree of displacement (i.e. how ‘bad’ the
xray looks), associated soft tissue injuries, associated injuries
impacting treatment and rehab decisions

3. Surgeon
factors—appropriate decision making, surgical technical skill,
doctor-patient communication (discussing injury, options, risks, and
expectations)

Rhetorically (and not), I ask- how much of the outcome can the surgeon possibly control?

The
answer, of course, is only the ‘surgeon factors’, which I will claim
generally make up a relatively small piece of the total outcome pie.

So
I say again (and again)- until I can get some converts… the future of
quality improvement lies not in just trying to identify ‘best
practices’ that can be difficult to prove and identify and can change
every few years—but rather in identifying what are the WRONG approaches
for conditions (much easier to get agreement here), and emphasizing the
importance of communicating appropriate expectations to patients.

HOSPITALS: Overpaid facility managers?

A long while ago (1995?) I was with Ian Morrison trying to sell something to an exec Mt Sinai Hospital in New York. Wondering by the exec’s office was Jack Rowe, lately of Aetna, but then the CEO of Mt Sinai. Ian was due to talk to their board; Jack noticed him and said something similar to, "don’t use your line about hospital CEO’s being overpaid facilities managers". It was half joking full serious.

Recently close to my neck of the woods there’s been a little fuss about salaries at El Camino Hospital–a district hospital in Mountain View, CA in the heart of Silicon Valley. (A district hospital is a weird California beast–basically a typical non-profit with some relatively minor tax support from the locale).

Back in the 1990s like many hospitals, El Camino was bleeding money. But the ship got righted. Now it makes a pretty decent profit with around $21m in income on something over $300m revenue. Still there was a big spat about whether or not the hospital (which does after all get some tax payer support) should tell the world about how much its CEO gets. Eventually they were forced to reveal all

El Camino Hospital’s chief executive officer earned a base salary of $492,291 in 2004, according to IRS Form 990, released by the hospital last week. In addition, CEO Lee Domanico received a bonus of $173,306, $9,000 in expenses and allowances and $249,127 in deferred compensation and contributions to his benefit plan. In 2002, the hospital lent the CEO $850,000 at 6 percent simple interest on a 10-year loan. Annual interest forgiveness is treated as additional compensation. In 2004, $19,380 in interest was forgiven.The typical salary of a CEO of an independent hospital with more than $200 million in annual revenue was $426,000 in 2004, according to Sullivan, Cotter and Associates, which prepared the comparison sheet the hospital released with the Form 990. The independent El Camino Hospital’s revenue is more than $300 million a year, Friedenberg said.

But actually it was rather more than that for the CEO, the scurrilous local rag the Mt View Voice reported

Tax documents released this week show El Camino Hospital CEO Lee Domanico received more than $900,000 in total compensation in the fiscal year ending June 30, and five other members of the hospital’s management team earned more than $300,000 during the period.

Compared to that the new guy, who starts Aug 7 but is going to have to scrape by:

Graham’s base salary is $543,000, which ranks him near the top of
his Bay Area counterparts. Washington Hospital in Fremont, also a
community district facility, pays CEO Nancy Farber a $424,557 base
salary. Domanico’s base was $500,000. Domanico’s contract also offered him a bonus of up to 40 to 45
percent of his base salary; Graham’s incentive pay will be capped at 30
percent of his base.

Now I know that living in Silicon Valley is expensive, but even so half a million bucks a year for running a community hospital seems like a pretty decent salary. Yet apparently they’re happy to believe that it’s par for the course–and it more or less is. USA Today had a piece on hospital CEO salaries a while back, but it really focused on the bigger non-profit systems which all pay a million or two. But there are roughly 2000 hospitals bigger than 200 beds but smaller than the giants. And if El Camino paying its execs that amount isn’t so out of line with other large community hospitals as their compensation excuse maker says–well perhaps running a hospital is just much harder than we cynics suppose it is. At any rate there are therefore some 2,000-ish CEOs making a prett decent whack.

Who knows, maybe the surgeons make the CEO pick up the tab.

QUALITY: Performance measures only have a little of the answer

(Hat-tip to Modern Healthcare for spotting this one). While there was lots of fuss about the IHI 1OOK lives campaign recently and whether it did or didn’t meet its target—and the NY Times gave it a pat on the back this morning in the Editorial section—there’s perhaps even more important news from a study published in JAMA today. A large multi-center team looked at the Medicare data for performance measures on post-heart attack patients with regard to how improved processes related to outcomes. These measures are the bedrock of the “we know what to do, but we don’t know how to do it” meme of IHI and the quality movement. In other words, the theory is that if we just did it all as well as the literature says we should, then there is potential for vast improvement. Unfortunately the outcomes are sobering for those of us who believe that if you apply relatively simple industrial processes to medicine it can markedly improve outcomes (and lower costs too).

We found moderately strong correlations (correlation coefficients ≥0.40; P values <.001) for all pairwise comparisons between beta-blocker use at admission and discharge, aspirin use at admission and discharge, and angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor use, and weaker, but statistically significant, correlations between these medication measures and smoking cessation counseling and time to reperfusion therapy measures (correlation coefficients <0.40; P values <.001). Some process measures were significantly correlated with risk-standardized, 30-day mortality rates (P values <.001) but together explained only 6.0% of hospital-level variation in risk-standardized, 30-day mortality rates for patients with AMI.

In other words, even when the hospitals did well on the performance measures, it only explained a small fraction of the overall variation in outcomes. So there are to my mind only two possible conclusions. Either performance measurements and controlling process variation don’t matter too much, or we actually—in this case at least—don’t know what works. Neither one is a particularly satisfying explanation.

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