Many opponents of Obamacare claim that large employers will drop employee health coverage in droves. The Wall Street Journal has made this argument a centerpiece of its opposition to the health exchanges. The argument has some face validity – employers that drop coverage can save about $10,000 per employee in insurance costs but only have to pay fines of $2000 per employee. What employer would not want to save $8000 per employee?
Supporters of Obamacare argue that if employers do not pay for insurance, they will have to increase wages. This will temper the incentives of employers to drop coverage. This follows from a classic model in labor economics that says that employers have to give workers a competitive wage/benefits bundle, and that the mix of wages and benefits is largely fungible. Thus, if benefits fall by $10,000, wages will increase by about the same amount. The theory is well accepted.
While it has been difficult to construct empirical tests of this theory, the available evidence is largely supportive (though the evidence of 1:1 fungibility is less compelling than the evidence of some degree of fungibility.) This may explain why the Congressional Budget Office predicts that only a few million workers will lose their employer sponsored coverage and get pushed onto the exchange. Even so, the Wall Street Journal and others have dismissed this theory and evidence, arguing that employers who drop coverage will pocket the full savings and therefore than tens of millions of workers will be affected.
I want to propose a simple test of the naysayers’ position. The test relies on evidence that the Wall Street Journal and others should find unimpeachable –stock market valuations. This is a quick and dirty test but the results are so compelling that I think it is sufficient.