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Tag: Medicare

Pop the Cost Bubble: Unallot Medicare

Victor Sandler

Here’s a dirty little secret: Cutting health care costs is not that difficult, nor will it harm patients. That’s because it only involves giving up unnecessary medical care—tests and treatments patients may want but really don’t need because they don’t benefit their health.

How is this supposed to happen? In Minnesota we call it “unallotment.” When the state had to reconcile a projected multibillion dollar budget deficit this year, and the Republican governor and Democratic lawmakers couldn’t agree on how to do it, the governor simply “unalloted” billions of dollars of planned expenditures.

Medicare should do the same. All Congress has to do is pass the MedPAC Reform Act of 2009 (SF 1110) and give it teeth. We can then unallot the 30 percent of Medicare expenses that most health care experts believe are unnecessary. That’s the 30 percent that goes for tests, drugs, and devices that don’t have any proven benefit but sell like hotcakes anyway.

When Gov. Tim Pawlenty decided to cut medical expenditures during the unallotment process, he took no prisoners. More than 30,000 indigent adults will simply have their medical insurance eliminated starting next March. Medicare would take a higher road, eliminating unnecessary care and costs, not “unnecessary” people.Continue reading…

Health Reform and Medicare: Part I

Here’s a pop quiz on health reform: Which prominent Republican said the following:

And if you don’t [oppose this health care legislation] and if I don’t do it, one of these days you and I are going to spend our sunset years telling our children, and our children’s children, what it once was like in America when men were free.

Johnson Signing Medicare

OK, it’s a trick question: the answer is Ronald Reagan, paid spokesman for the American Medical Association’s Women’s Auxiliary, speaking in 1961 against the bill that ultimately emerged as Medicare. (A recording of his “coffee klatch” talk, “Ronald Reagan Speaks Out Against Socialized Medicine,” is here.

Although what political scientist Jonathan Oberlander has termed “a politics of consensus” lasted for some thirty years after Medicare’s enactment, bipartisanship broke down in 1995 when Newt Gingrich targeted Medicare for cuts of 30% and urged privatization using managed care. By the lights of conservative Republicans, severe cuts in traditional Medicare would encourage flight to managed care alternatives, so that, in the famous phrase of Newt Gingrich, Medicare would “wither on the vine.” (1 St. Louis U.J. Health L. & Pol’y 5-43 (2007), Abstract). Although President Clinton used the Republicans’ Medicare reform to his own benefit (polls showed that his defense of Medicare helped him secure re-election), ultimately much of the Republicans’ agenda for reform was adopted in 2003. Since then Republicans have not relented in their criticism of the program– with some in leadership positions even questioning the government’s role in health care for seniors. (See Rachel Maddow’s cable television show featuring a parade of video clips of Republicans bashing Medicare, including former Speaker DeLay –echoed by Representative Roy Blunt–asserting that “Medicare shouldn’t be a government program”).

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Medicare Policy Might Discourage Proper Care for Hospital-Acquired Infections

Medicare’s recent policy of refusing to pay hospitals’ additional costs to treat hospital-acquired infections fails to adequately incentivize prevention and proper treatment of these complications, associated with 99,000 deaths annually. A recent analysis by Peter McNair and colleagues in the journal Health Affairs suggests that, in the entire state of California, only 11 hospitalizations complicated by infection would have received lower reimbursement as a result of the policy if it had been in place in 2006.The Medicare policy focuses on infections that have low mortality, such as catheter-associated urinary tract infections, and infections that affect few people, such as mediastinitis after CABG surgery. This means that the vast majority of severe hospital-acquired infections remain completely unregulated.

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Obama’s Medicare Half-Truth

Picture 12

Obama was called a liar during his recent address to a joint session of Congress. Actually, he was not fully truthful about the implications of cuts to Medicare. Obama repeated that his health reform plan includes payment cuts for private Medicare Advantage (MA) health plans:

The only thing this plan would eliminate is the
hundreds of billions of dollars in waste and fraud, as well as
unwarranted subsidies in Medicare that go to insurance companies —
subsidies that do everything to pad their profits and nothing to
improve your care. … So don’t pay attention to those scary stories
about how your benefits will be cut… That will never happen on my
watch. I will protect Medicare.

Obama’s claim that the cuts will trim insurer profits but not Medicare benefits was meant to calm nervous seniors. As I and others have pointed out the proposed cuts will in fact reduce benefits to some degree, contrary to the President’s assertion. But seniors, in general, should not be concerned. First, only about 23% of Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in an MA plan.

Continue reading…

The Chairman’s Mark – Good Ideas, Potentially Fatal Flaws

Roger Collier

So, at long last, Senator Max Baucus has released his Chairman’s Mark draft health care reform bill for discussion by the full Senate Finance Committee. The 223-page draft bill is generally consistent with the “Framework for a Plan” document that Senator Baucus issued last week. So, no big surprises. But can it make coverage more accessible and affordable? Can it put the brakes on skyrocketing health care costs? Is it likely to help or hurt the economic recovery?

Accessibility and affordability are the main thrusts of the draft. As with the other Senate and House bills, an individual mandate would be imposed and the insurance market would be reformed to assure coverage on a guaranteed issue basis. Also as with the other bills, Medicaid would be expanded to cover anyone below 133 percent of FPL (but with the federal government picking up more of the tab), while subsidies would be available to other lower-income individuals who buy coverage through an insurance exchange. Additionally, benefit standards would be set for the individual and small group markets, with limits on cost-sharing.

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Is an IOM v. CBO Smackdown Looming on Health-Reform Costs?

The U.S. can cut health-care spending by $250 billion a year within a decade, a
congressionally chartered panel will say this month in a bid to
show costs can be contained even if all Americans are insured.

A report from the Institute of Medicine, which advises the
federal government on health care, will counter “stingy”
estimates from the Congressional Budget Office, said Arnold
Milstein
, planning chairman of the institute’s working group on
health costs. The panel’s annual figure is five times the amount
the budget office says the U.S. will save under a bill in the
House of Representatives, according to the budget office’s July
17 letter to House Ways and Means Committee chairman Charles
Rangel
.

The preliminary findings from the institute, part of the
National Academies in Washington, will be issued amid a growing
debate over the health-care overhaul proposals that President
Barack Obama
is urging Congress to pass. The report will help
bolster the argument that covering the nation’s 46 million
uninsured won’t bust the budget, advocates of the bill say.

Continue reading…

Obama’s Medicare Half-Truth

Picture 12

Obama was called a liar during his recent address to a joint session of Congress. Actually, he was not fully truthful
about the implications of cuts to Medicare. Obama repeated that his
health reform plan includes payment cuts for private Medicare Advantage
(MA) health plans:

The only thing this plan would eliminate is the
hundreds of billions of dollars in waste and fraud, as well as
unwarranted subsidies in Medicare that go to insurance companies —
subsidies that do everything to pad their profits and nothing to
improve your care. … So don’t pay attention to those scary stories
about how your benefits will be cut… That will never happen on my
watch. I will protect Medicare.

Obama’s claim that the cuts will trim insurer profits but not Medicare benefits was meant to calm nervous seniors. As I and others
have pointed out the proposed cuts will in fact reduce benefits to some
degree, contrary to the President’s assertion. But seniors, in
general, should not be concerned. First, only about 23% of Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in an MA plan.

Continue reading…

Ornish Alienates HuffPo’s Class Warriors

Ariana Huffington recently anointed diet-and-exercise guru Dean Ornish as her chief medical correspondent. With all the guff her site had taken from the science-based medicine crowd for giving free rein to anti-vaccinists, faith healers and the no-evidence-needed alternative medicine freaks, I thought it was a smart move — a tack toward the responsible center, if you will.But in a post this week, Ornish recounted his 14-year-battle to get Medicare to pay for a pilot project to test lifestyle intervention as a cure for heart disease (which wouldn’t save Medicare money, but would save more lives for the same money expended as, say, giving those people cholesterol-lowering medication). What he drew from his saga was that the government can’t be trusted to run health care, and that health care reformers needed to rise above the right-left divide and unite around reimbursing physicians for keeping people well.It was a classic case of crunchy granola versus the class warriors. The comments section was overwhelmed with hostile attacks on Ornish’s above-the-fray moralizing. The commentators defended single-payer, pointed out the indiscriminate nature of many diseases, articulated the special needs of the poor whose stress and multiple jobs make them especially prone to disease, etc. etc. What was striking was how thoughtful and well-reasoned many of the comments were, a far cry from conspiracy-minded rants of that usually dominate the comments space.

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Time for a Closer Look (and Lower Costs)

By ROGER COLLIER

Democrats-cap-and-trade-bill-house-renewable

One of the effects of the exaggerations, misinterpretations, distortions, and downright lies about Congressional health care reform proposals—mostly from far-right politicians and their hangers-on—has been to deter more objective analysis.

In fact, two key features of the current Senate and House bills—the insurance exchange structure, and the controversial public plan option—need much closer examination, and possibly considerable revision.

FIRST, the insurance exchange structure. It’s a reasonable concept: if insurers were to compete via an exchange for individual and small group business, they would offer highly competitive rates to attract as much business as possible.

Unfortunately, as a Health Affairs blog piece by the former managers of the PacAdvantage exchange makes clear, it isn’t as simple as that. PacAdvantage, which served some 150,000 California small business employees, ultimately collapsed and closed its doors in 2006, a victim of adverse selection. As the PacAdvantage managers explain, having insurers also marketing directly to small groups allowed them to cherry pick the best risks, leaving the less-good risks in the exchange. As adverse selection continued its work, the exchange went into a death spiral with worsening exchange risk leading to higher rates, leading to the least-bad risks leaving the exchange, leading to even higher exchange rates, and so on.

The obvious way to avoid this problem in national reform is to require that ALL individuals and ALL small group employees be included in each regional exchange. Unfortunately, health reforming politicians have adopted “you’ll be able to retain your existing coverage” as part of their reform pitch. It’s understandable, since forcing groups to switch to an exchange is not going to help the prospects of legislation that’s already in trouble, but it instantly opens the door to cherry-picking by insurers, with the prospect of failure of every exchange.

Is there a solution? Rather than imposing an additional mandate on businesses, current bills could be modified to require that all insurers participate in the exchange, and that their exchange rates be no higher than those offered directly to any insured group, thereby forcing insurers to treat exchange and non-exchange insureds as part of the same pool and avoiding the adverse selection effect.

SECOND, the public plan option. So far, the political controversy has focused on the obvious arguments for and against the public plan: it would force insurers to offer better rates, but it could push millions of Americans out of private coverage into a government program.

A close look at data from Medicare Advantage, in which private plans compete with the traditional government option, indicates that both arguments are questionable.

MA’s private coverage alternative is indeed more costly than traditional Medicare, by some 13 percent—more than $11 billion in 2009. However, most of the difference is due to the additional benefits offered. The private plans’ 2009 base bids to CMS—excluding the cost of additional benefits—averaged 102 percent of FFS rates, with HMO and PPO bids averaging just 99 percent of FFS.

These base bid rates include profit and administrative costs, in contrast to the FFS rates which exclude both administration and financing costs. Even the most conservative estimate of these additional costs would put fully-loaded FFS rates above those of the average private plan.

The comparison of Medicare FFS and MA plans is further skewed by the MA bid process. Not only do the ridiculously high “county benchmarks” used in payment setting favor high bids, but the payment formula (which discounts the difference between the base bid and the benchmark, but not the base bid itself) encourages excessive loading of profit and administration into the base bid. In other words, in a more rationally designed competitive environment, average private plan costs should be significantly below those of traditional Medicare.

In terms of the current Senate Health and House bills, with proposed payment rates higher than Medicare, the public plan looks even less competitive.  While there would undoubtedly be some who would opt for a government program over a private plan, the vast majority are likely to choose the lower cost option, with the public plan more likely to increase health care costs than decrease them.

Are there compromises that might satisfy liberal politicians’ desires for a public plan? One possibility is to build a “trigger” into the bills that would allow creation of public plans only where private plans fail to meet cost control benchmarks.

Another possibility is to build on the existing public plan for the non-elderly: Medicaid. Congressional committees are already proposing Medicaid expansions, while simultaneously proposing subsidies to make exchange participation more affordable for non-Medicaid eligibles, leading to an anomalous situation in which one family may receive free Medicaid coverage, while a second family whose income is only a few dollars greater is forced to pay a significant part of the exchange premium in order to comply with an individual coverage mandate.

A less costly and unfair approach might be to allow individuals to buy-in to Medicaid. Since average per capita Medicaid costs are approximately $2000, compared with estimated subsidy costs of close to $4000 (based on CBO estimates, in 2009 dollars), this would eliminate both the anomaly and the need for subsidies, with a potential dramatic reduction in the ten-year cost of reform of some $770 billion.

Roger Collier was formerly CEO of a national health care consulting firm. His experience includes the design and implementation of innovative health care programs for HMOs, health insurers, and state and federal agencies. He is editor of Health Care Reform Update.

More on health care reform by this author:

The Health Care Cost Shifting Myth

By AUSTIN FRAKT

Picture 12 There is a pervasive notion that providers of health care can make up for lower payments received from one set of payers (e.g. Medicare, Medicaid, uncompensated care) by increasing prices charged to other payers (e.g. private insurance companies). To the extent it occurs cost shifting offsets attempts to control overall health care costs through reduced fees paid by public insurers. It makes “bending the cost curve” harder.

However, it is a myth that providers can fully shift costs. That they could do so violates, in most cases, principles of economics. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests cost shifting, where it occurs, is done so a minimal level: only a small fraction of decreased payments by public payers shows up as an increase in charges to private payers. Losses associated with one payer are largely not recouped from another.

Some take price discrimination as evidence of cost shifting. However, price differentials are not necessarily the recouping of losses from one payer by overcharging another. As described in the 2001 Health Affairs paper by Richard Frank “Prescription Drug Prices: Why Do Some Pay More Than Others Do?” price discrimination can be due to unequal bargaining power across classes of purchasers. In other words, in maximizing profits, providers charge different prices to different market segments. In such cases, by definition, profits cannot be further increased by cost shifting.

It’s true that cost shifting could theoretically occur under specific conditions. One case is when a provider has monopoly power that it has not fully exploited, for instance charging private insurers less than it could. More fully exploiting its monopoly power with respect to those payers, such a provider can recoup losses. Still, there is a limit to how much of the lost revenue can be recouped. The monopoly profit-maximizing price level imposes a ceiling.

Another instance in which cost shifting could occur is in a more competitive market in which all providers have roughly the same level of undercompensated care. All competitors in such a market might choose to increase charges to private insurers by the same amount, maintaining their relative competitive positions. However, if one competitor elects to reduce costs or reduce its burden of undercompensated care, it might be able to charge private insurers less then others, thereby increasing its market share. So, cost shifting may not be a stable equilibrium.

The literature provides estimates of the extent of cost shifting in cases where it is theoretically possible. The March 2009 MedPAC Report to Congress: Medicare Payment Policy (Chapter 2A) includes a summary of such evidence. It concludes that the dominant dynamic in the market is that hospitals with strong market power have abundant financial resources. In turn they have a high cost structure (perhaps due to provision of relatively higher quality care) that causes lower or negative Medicare margins. In contrast, hospitals that are forced to run efficiently are adequately funded by Medicare payments. That is, Medicare payments are sufficient to cover costs but some hospitals run inefficiently and make it appear otherwise. Therefore, MedPAC has concluded that increased Medicare payments to hospitals would not reduce rates charged to private insurers. The primary effect would be to induce lower cost operations.

The MedPAC report cites mixed evidence from the literature on the level of cost shifting, as does the December 2008 CBO report Key Issues in Analyzing Major Health Insurance Proposals. A few studies from the 1980s found evidence of cost shifting at a rate of up to fifty cents on the dollar. However, conditions in the 1990s were less conducive to cost shifting and the rates were found to be on the order of a 0.4 to 1.7 percent increase in private payments in response to a 10 percent reduction in Medicare and Medicaid fees. In a 2005 study of geographic variation in health costs of the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, the GAO concluded that the considerable variation it found was not due to variations in payments from other payers.

In conclusion, cost shifting is not as large and widespread a phenomenon as some would believe. Under some market conditions it is inconsistent with economic theory. And, while it can occur under other market conditions it is far from a dollar-for-dollar shift in costs. The most recent studies of the phenomenon find little evidence of cost shifting or very low levels of it. Claims that reductions in public payments for health care will necessarily show up as commensurate increases in private payments are unfounded.

Austin Frakt blogs at The Incidental Economist and is a health economist and principal investigator with the Department of Veterans Affairs’ Health Services Research and Development Service and assistant professor with the Boston University School of Public Health, Department of Health Policy and Management. The views expressed in this post are his alone and do not necessarily reflect the positions of Boston University or the Department of Veterans Affairs.