The concept of “centers of excellence” has been around for a few decades. Surely sending health plan members and self-insured employers’ employees to the best and most effective providers should improve health outcomes and save payers’ money? Sach Jain is CEO of Carrum which has been working on this problem, partnering with the best providers and aggregating that demand from employers…and putting it all on a state of the art platform. As you might suspect, it’s not as easy as it looks. Carrum raised $45m from Omers Ventures a few weeks back, on top of a decent raise from Tiger Global a couple of years back. So are they getting it right? Sach told Matthew Holt that they are for sure on their way….
Matthew’s tidbits: Obesity Summer
Every time I get around to sending out the THCB READER I add a short & usually not to sweet commentary on some aspect of health care.–Matthew Holt
I saw the obesity crisis up close this week. And by that I’m not just referring to my addiction to Salted Caramel with Pretzel Ice Cream, bad though it is. Instead I felt thin because I went to Disneyland. But while I tip the scales at a BMI of 30 if I’m lucky, I genuinely felt that looking around Disneyland more than 50% of the crowd were obese and many morbidly so.
The rest of my trip to Southern California was quite a contrast because I’ve been watching a girls water polo tournament. Those young women and most of their families, as you’d expect, look very different. In this crowd I am definitely on the other end of the spectrum.
Obviously there’s a big socio-economic difference between the Disneyland attendees and a crowd centered around a sport largely played by rich, white kids. But at a time where we are arguing about whether Ozempic and its fellow anti-obesity drugs should be available via insurance, we seem to have no other strategies to fight the nation’s slide to obesity.
You’ve probably seen those photos of people on the beach in the 1960s where everyone is thin. I won’t claim to understand the science of what happened but clearly the prevalence of high fructose corn syrup and other highly processed food has much to do with it. As does the free rein food companies have had to advertise what are addictive products. I don’t know how we get to be a nation where everyone eats and exercises like a water polo player. But clearly we need significant changes in our agriculture and nutrition policies. We did it with smoking, so we know it can be done. If you don’t think we need it, I recommend a trip to Disneyland (and that’s the only reason I recommend one!)
Matthew’s health care tidbits: Time to get Cynical
Each time I send out the THCB Reader, our newsletter that summarizes the best of THCB (Sign up here!) I include a brief tidbits section. Then I had the brainwave to add them to the blog. They’re short and usually not too sweet! –Matthew Holt
Plenty of reason to worry about the future of American health care this week. The biggest for-profit hospital chain–HCA–was accused of aggressively pushing patients into hospice care, sometimes in the same room, in order to make their hospitality mortality numbers look better. Most of the leading benefits consulting companies were exposed as taking payments from PBMs–yup, the same organizations their employer clients thought they were negotiating with on their behalf. And one of the biggest names in digital health, Babylon Health, tumbled into destitution, taking billions of dollars with it and leaving uncertain the fate of the medical groups in California it bought less than two years ago. Even the most successful capitalists in health care — United HealthGroup and its fellow insurers — saw their stock fall because apparently outpatient surgery volume is ticking up.
On the policy front the malaise is spreading too. The end of the public health emergency (remember Covid?) is being used as an excuse by the old confederate states to kick people off Medicaid. Georgia and Arkansas appear to be bringing back work requirements, even though I thought CMS has banned them and every study has acknowledged that they are cruel and ineffective. About 20 million people got on to Medicaid during the public health emergency and KFF estimates up to 17 million may be kicked off, while over 1.7 million already have.
Finally an article by Bob Kocher and Bob Wachter in Health Affairs Scholar remins us that big academic medical centers are nowhere near ready for value-based care (VBC). Jeff Goldsmith has been vocal on THCBGang and elsewhere about how VBC is becoming a religion more than a reality. And I remind you that Humana’s MA program is still basically a Fee-For-service program in drag (even though that’s now illegal in their home state).
I grew up in American health care expecting that eventually a combination of universal insurance mixed with value-based purchasing would lead to a series of tech-enabled companies doing the right thing by patients and making money to boot. With the managed care revolution, the ACA and the boom in digital health all firmly in the rear view mirror, the summer of 2023 is a lesson that you can never be too cynical about health care in America.
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Matthew’s health care tidbits: Hedge Funds that Do Health Care on the Side
Each time I send out the THCB Reader, our newsletter that summarizes the best of THCB (Sign up here!) I include a brief tidbits section. Then I had the brainwave to add them to the blog. They’re short and usually not too sweet! –Matthew Holt
Lots of news about bad behavior in health care this week, with real shots about patient & staff safety at home care company Papa, and Grail misinforming 400 people that they had cancer. But the prize for tone deafness this week comes from another very well funded health care provider system being heartless to its poorest patients.
This week it’s Allina, a Minnesota “nice” system which actually amended its Epic system so that clinicians could literally not book appointments or provide care to patients who owed Allina money. Clinicians on the sharp end of this were so appalled that they went on the record about their own employer to NY Times’ reporter Sarah Kliff. The most egregious example was a doctor unable to write a prescription for a kid that had scabies–an infectious parasitic disease–who was sharing one bed with two other kids!
Of course Allina also is on the low end of charity care provision (below 1% of revenues). In contrast ten employees make more than $1m a year and another 10 make more than $500,000.
We all know about egregious private equity funds investing in payday loans and other scummy outfits that prey on the poor. Turns out that if you let a non-profit hospital become beholden to its financial, rather than moral, north star, it starts to behave in a similar manner. Allina, of course, had a smidge under $4bn in its “investment reserve” at the end of 2021. It’s by no means special. UPMC has over $7bn in its reserves (unclear if this includes the investments it has made in startups), while Ascension has a formal private equity fund that controversially paid its former CEOs over $10m as part of its $18bn reserves.
Somehow having hedge funds that provide a little health care service on the side doesn’t leave the best taste in the mouth for how we should be organizing this health care system.
Matthew’s health care tidbits: Health care pricing is cray-zee
Each time I send out the THCB Reader, our newsletter that summarizes the best of THCB (Sign up here!) I include a brief tidbits section. Then I had the brainwave to add them to the blog. They’re short and usually not too sweet! –Matthew Holt
It’s no secret that health care pricing has been out of whack for a very long time. This past week PBMs and pharma manufacturers were in front of congressional committees trying to defend the indefensible–how much drugs cost and why? Hospitals have been required to publish their fictional price lists (their chargemasters) for a few years now and more recently have been instructed to reveal what they actually get from health plans for specific procedures. You would assume that this would move overall pricing pressure down to the “best price” but that effect seems to not be happening. At least not yet. This week also did see the bankruptcy of PE-backed (or should that be PE-toppled) emergency staffing corporation Envision. But that was more because its business model depended on surprise billing and not being in insurer networks.
More typical is the recent dispute in which primary & urgent care chain Carbon Health went public with its fight against Elevance subsidiary Anthem Blue Cross in California. While it was in-network Carbon claims that it received less than Medicare rates from Anthem, while its large delivery system competitors were getting 2-4 times Medicare rates.
This sounds about right to me. Late last year I had two identical telemedicine visits for back pain with specialists. One in a private practice, another with a doctor from UCSF–my local academic medical center. Before you troll me, they were both offered to me last minute, I didn’t know which doctor would be available if I needed a procedure, and it’s always good to get a second opinion. Plus I had blown through my deductible by then so they were free to me!
My insurer paid $795 to UCSF and $219 to the private doctor. So for exactly the same thing one provider got more than 3&½ times what the other did.
There’s still lots of chatter about the growth of value-based care, but even within Medicare Advantage there’s lots of fee-for-service, and it even pops up in places it’s supposed to be dead-–like Geisinger. We are nearly 20 years on from the Bush Administration talking about transparency as the solution to health care costs yet the opacity and confusion around pricing is as bad as it’s ever been. Yes, we know some of the numbers, but the US is a long way from seeing the invisible hand working its magic and making the same thing cost the same amount across health care. The only place where that happens is under the neo-Stalinist central pricing of Medicare. Not that that seems to work well either.
There’ll be a couple more years while the “new” transparent plays out in the market, but don’t expect too much of a revolution. Then likely we’ll try something else.
Can we trust ChatGPT to get the basics right?
by MATTHEW HOLT
Eric Topol has a piece in his excellent newsletter Ground Truth‘s today about AI in medicine. He refers to the paper he and colleagues wrote in Nature about Generalist Medical Artificial Intelligence (the medical version of GAI). It’s more on the latest in LLM (Large Language Models). They differ from previous AI which was essentially focused on one problem, and in medicine that mostly meant radiology. Now, you can feed different types of information in and get lots of different answers.
Eric & colleagues concluded their paper with this statement: “Ultimately, GMAI promises unprecedented possibilities for healthcare, supporting clinicians amid a range of essential tasks, overcoming communication barriers, making high-quality care more widely accessible, and reducing the administrative burden on clinicians to allow them to spend more time with patients.” But he does note that “there are striking liabilities and challenges that have to be dealt with. The “hallucinations” (aka fabrications or BS) are a major issue, along with bias, misinformation, lack of validation in prospective clinical trials, privacy and security and deep concerns about regulatory issues.”
What he’s saying is that there are unexplained errors in LLMs and therefore we need a human in the loop to make sure the AI isn’t getting stuff wrong. I myself had a striking example of this on a topic that was purely simple calculation about a well published set of facts. I asked ChatGPT (3 not 4) about the historical performance of the stock market. Apparently ChatGPT can pass the medical exams to become a doctor. But had it responded with the same level of accuracy about a clinical issue I would be extremely concerned!
The brief video of my use of ChatGPT for stock market “research” is below:
Matthew’s health care tidbits: The drug model for DTx was wrong
Each time I send out the THCB Reader, our newsletter that summarizes the best of THCB (Sign up here!) I include a brief tidbits section. Then I had the brainwave to add them to the blog. They’re short and usually not too sweet! –Matthew Holt
If you were to look at pharmaceuticals in the US you might make three observations. 1) They are the most important way health conditions are helped, cured or eradicated. 2) The way they are delivered to patients (via pharmacies) is very badly integrated with the health care delivery system. 3) They are way too expensive.
OK, so those are my observations not yours but I think you’ll agree they’re all true.
Now I am going to tell you that we’ve developed a technology that lives in your phone that has the same impact as a drug, if not better. It will cure your depression, insomnia, pain, even maybe Alzheimer’s. And because it is a software product, not a drug you ingest, it has no (or at least few) dangerous side effects. And because it’s software and easy to distribute to millions of people, it can be cheap. Wouldn’t it be a great idea for the people managing health conditions—a patient’s clinical care team—to directly integrate this technology into the care they are delivering?
Some of the people building these technologies agreed, but most of them decided that they liked the current model of prescription pharmaceuticals. They built these cool technologies and decided to distribute them via physician prescriptions and charge for them like pharmaceuticals. To do that, they had to get FDA approval for their “Prescription Digital Therapeutics” (DTx) via expensive clinical trials. Additionally, of course, they hoped to get government-backed monopoly status–called patents in the pharma business.
In general in health care, the FDA regulates things that go into the body and may cause damage. The rest of clinical medicine has great latitude for experimentation, technique and technology development, and allows others to copy what works.
The companies heading down the Prescription DTx route also used the business model of regular pharma and biotech companies. They raised large amounts of money up front, applied for patents, went through the FDA clinical trial process, and hoped to charge significant amounts per patient once their DTx were approved and prescribed.
None of them seemed to care that if they succeeded, their DTx would necessarily only be accessed by a small population at great cost. None of them seemed to notice that their DTx were usually an electronic distillment of teaching, patient advice, coaching therapy or other activities that look more like extensions of traditional clinical care, as opposed to ingested pharmaceuticals.
Many of these companies are now in deep trouble. They raised money when it was cheap or even, like Pear and Better Therapeutics, took advantage of the SPAC vehicles to IPO. Now they have found that they cant get their DTx through the FDA process quickly enough or aren’t seeing the prescribing numbers they needed to make their products a success. Since the digital health stock crash, it’s very hard for them to raise more money. Pear Tx this week announced it was trying to sell itself.
My hope is that we get a reset. I want digital therapies that are extensions of clinical care to be widely used and widely available as part of the care process, and for their care to be integrated into clinical care –rather than to be prescribed and then delivered by some third-party. And, because they are software and because software scales, I want them to be cheap. Hopefully that is the future of DTx.
On second thoughts, that wouldn’t be a bad future for regular pharmaceuticals either!
Matthew’s health care tidbits: Oh, the DEA makes me sigh….
Each time I send out the THCB Reader, our newsletter that summarizes the best of THCB (Sign up here!) I include a brief tidbits section. Then I had the brainwave to add them to the blog. They’re short and usually not too sweet! –Matthew Holt
I have always thought that the dual role of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) was an anachronism that severely hampers America’s complex relationship with pharmaceuticals. Congress deems some medicines legal and regulates them via the FDA, and deems others illegal and tells the DEA and other law enforcement agencies to attempt to control their supply. Leaving aside the basic futility of this task, somehow DEA was also given the task of regulating the prescribers of legal prescription (and non-prescription) drugs–in particular those around controlled substances.
This has led to decades of DEA-led persecution of doctors, patients and even convenience store clerks in the name of reducing the diversion of opiates and methamphetamines. Of course going after any of these folks is much easier and less risky than hunting a Mexican cartel or busting real criminals, so it’s easy to see why the DEA has taken that approach. Has it worked in reducing the supply of opiates? Maybe. Has it had any impact on the opiate crisis? Not really. Have a whole lot of patients been caught in the crossfire? Yup.
Now the DEA is moving onto the next phase–re-regulating the online prescribing of controlled substances that was liberalized at the start of the public health emergency in 2020. As you can imagine, their proposals are not exactly bursting with reason.
The DEA is essentially banning all controlled prescribing without a face to face visit first. This is despite the fact that the demand for those mental health medications increased dramatically during the pandemic as rates of depression and anxiety went up by a factor of three. While you can argue that in 2021 and 2022 some online services (notably Cerebral) may–and I stress may–have crossed the over-prescribing line for ADHD and other conditions, there’s no evidence that what happened is any worse than the in-person care that the DEA has been inadequately overseeing for decades. More importantly, those online services have already pulled out of those exact therapeutic markets the DEA is alarmed about. Who is left providing online ADHD care? Local clinicians and reputable services. And of course DEA knows full well, and is doing nothing about, the lack of access to mental health professionals that existed long before the increase in demand.
Is there any reason to suspect DEA will improve the quality of the system dealing with these medications? Highly doubtful. There are two current examples suggesting why not. First, due to the increased demand from the pandemic induced mental-health crisis and production problems at pharma company Teva, there’s a massive shortage of ADHD medication already. The DEA could help patients out here, but have declined to increase production quotas–sending millions of patients and their parents on a wild goose chase hunting down pharmacies with actual supply of Adderall and related meds.
Secondly, the DEA wants to also ban the the online prescribing of another drug, buprenorphine, which is used to help wean patients with substance use disorder off opiates and other substances. OK, so there’s a one month grace period here but essentially this is a short-sighted ban that will directly lead to patients going to the black market to acquire opiates, leading to more addiction and death.
My conclusion is that the DEA should be removed from its oversight of licensed clinicians and that role be given to FDA or HHS. At the least these proposed regulations should be abandoned and rolled back to what we have now. The only good news is that there is still time to comment on the regulations. I went and did so and I hope you will too. Patients have suffered enough already.
Matthew’s health care tidbits: Medicare Advantage is now a provider fracking contest
Each time I send out the THCB Reader, our newsletter that summarizes the best of THCB (Sign up here!) I include a brief tidbits section. Then I had the brainwave to add them to the blog. They’re short and usually not too sweet! –Matthew Holt
Yes it’s time to talk Medicare Advantage (MA). It’s been a huge couple of weeks for the world of MA. On the commercial side, CVS bought the biggest pure play MA provider, Oak Street Health for $10bn. This pissed me off as if they paid $2 a share more I’d have made a profit on the stock I foolishly bought “on a dip” in 2021.
But this amazed many of us on THCB Gang, as they paid a huge premium and it works out to some $60k per patient. Now health care organizations have been overpaying for patient “lives” as long as I can remember–going at least as far back as Aetna nearly going out of business when it bought US Healthcare in 1996. So why is today’s incarnation of Aetna buying providers?
Well that’s to do with the regulatory side of MA. I have been on record since the very first post of THCB that Medicare FFS is an inefficient and expensive program–even if 80% of American hospitals say they lose money on it and have to charge commercial insurers more to make up for it. But while it’s possible to agree with George Halvorson that MA delivers better care at a lower cost than FFS Medicare, it is simultaneously possible to believe that MA costs more than it should. That’s because of aggressive RAF upcoding that’s been built both into home visits from companies like Signify and also into the EMRs doctors have been using to code MA members’ health status.
There are lots of proposals on how to fix this–including this one from Chenmed on how to change MA from paying for inputs (i.e how sick people are when they join MA) to outputs (how much better they got while in MA). But it’s clear that CMS is now officially coming after upcoding including full cross plan audits back to 2018. Even if not back to 2011. The MA plans will grumble about those past audits and tie CMS up in court but they know going forward the game is up
To make more money in MA they need to get hold and shake loose or frack some of the 85% of the premium that goes to provider organizations. Hence they are all getting into bed with them or buying them outright. UHG, Humana & now Aetna/CVS have been buying physician groups that serve MA populations at a quickening rate, and their goal is to put more of the 50% of seniors already into MA into those groups.
Will this save any money? Well probably not, at least not yet. Humana has been reporting on the costs in its full risk capitated MA groups versus its FFS ones for a couple of years, and the difference is a rounding error. But the point is that the next war in Medicare Advantage is going to be what happens inside these plan-owned medical groups. So expect a lot more scrutiny of both costs, outcomes and patient experience within MA focused medical groups starting about now.
Matthew’s health care tidbits: How do you tell the price of a drug?
Each time I send out the THCB Reader, our newsletter that summarizes the best of THCB (Sign up here!) I include a brief tidbits section. Then I had the brainwave to add them to the blog. They’re short and usually not too sweet! –Matthew Holt
As the average THCB reader is probably all too well aware I live in Marin County, California and therefore my kids are on amphetamine-based medication for ADHD. This is annoying as all get out because, as a controlled substance, this medication needs to be re-prescribed every month (no automatic refills allowed). In addition no 90 day supplies are allowed, and the kids must have checkups with their prescribing physician every 3 months (which are not cheap).
It’s not just prescribing which is complicated. Supply is an issue too and frequently pharmacies run out. This is furtherly frustrating because if one pharmacy is out it can’t move the Rx to another, even in the same chain like Walgreens or CVS. The new pharmacy requires a whole new prescription. I discovered last year that Alto Pharmacy, a VC backed home delivery pharmacy, will deliver controlled medications. This has saved me 12-24 visits to CVS in the past year.
But with a new year there are new problems. The “allowed” price, i.e. the price my insurer Blue Cross of Massachusetts had agreed with Alto Pharmacy (and other pharmacies) for the specific generic for one of my kids somehow went from $29 a month to $107. That’s the amount I actually pay until we hit our $4,500 family deductible. Incidentally because it’s a medication we still pay $10 a month after we hit the deductible.
Alto kept telling me that the cash price was around $50. But of course if we pay the lower cash price (either there or elsewhere using GoodRx) that doesn’t count against the deductible. So if we hit the deductible we are out the $50 (which works out to roughly $1200 per year for 2 kids). I kept asking Alto what had changed that made the cost go up? They kept not telling me an answer, other than it cost $107. I asked the good people at Health Tech Nerds slack group if they could guess what was going on. Their consensus was that the formulary tier had been changed. “But it’s a generic”, (I foolishly thought).
Finally I called the pharmacy number on BCBS Massachusetts website, and ended up talking to someone at CVS Caremark– their PBM. In the course of the 30 minute call they ran a dummy claim with several other pharmacies. All came back at the $107 number. They then looked up the formulary to see if it had changed. Meanwhile I looked at the formulary on the BCBS Mass website while this was going on. The medication was still tier 1. So why has the cost to me and perhaps to the Blues plan gone up from $29 a month to $107? (Yes that’s more than a factor of 3!)
While she was talking to me the Caremark rep was also able to Slack with several other colleagues–relatively advanced for an old world PBM I thought. Eventually the answer came back. The med was indeed tier one. But until we spent our deductible the med was tier 2. In other words if we were paying for the drug the price is $107. As soon as BCBS Massachusetts starts paying for it the price goes back to $29 (of which they only pay $19) as we have a $10 copay.
Why this has happened is beyond me? Is Caremark or BCBS Massachusetts suggesting another cheaper drug? I haven’t heard from them. Are they trying to discourage patients from getting to their deductibles? My cynical conclusion is that Caremark is trying to increase the revenue for CVS– its corporate pharmacy–which that accounts for 1/3 of all outpatient Rx.
Otherwise this pricing strategy makes no sense to me. Of course this is just another example of a completely opaque process. And that appears typical for American health care.
