It’s been two years since I first started my new practice. I have successfully avoided driving my business into the ground because I am a dumb-ass doctor. Don’t get me wrong: I am not a dumb-ass when it comes to being a doctor. I am pretty comfortable on that, but the future will hold many opportunities to change that verdict. No, I am talking about being a dumb-ass running the businessbecause I am a doctor.
We doctors are generally really bad at running businesses, and I am no exception. In my previous practice, I successfully delegated any authority I had as the senior partner so that I didn’t know what was going on in most of the practice.
The culmination of this was when I was greeted by a “Dear Rob” letter from my partners who wanted a divorce from me. It wasn’t a total shock that this happened, but it wasn’t fun. My mistake in this was to back off and try to “just be a doctor while others ran the business.” It’s my business, and I should have known what was happening. I didn’t, and it is now no longer my business.
This new business was built on the premise that I am a dumb-ass doctor when it comes to business. I consciously avoided making things too complicated. I wanted no copays for visits (and hence no need to collect money each visit). I wanted no long-term contracts (and hence no need to refund money if I or the patient was hit by a meteor or attacked by a yeti). The goal was to keep things as easy as possible, and this is a very good business policy.
Continue reading “How to Avoid Being a Dumb-Ass Doctor, Blog Edition”
Filed Under: Physicians, THCB, The Business of Health Care
Tagged: business models, Change Management, Dr. Rob Lamberts, Dumb Ass Doctors, Economics, practice management, Small Practice
Feb 20, 2015
M.I.T. economist Jonathan Gruber, whom his colleagues in the profession hold in very high esteem for his prowess in economic analysis, recently appeared before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Gruber was called to explain several caustic remarks he had offered on tortured language and provisions in the Affordable Care Act (the ACA) that allegedly were designed to fool American voters into accepting the ACA.
Many of these linguistic contortions, however, were designed not so much to fool voters, but to force the Congressional Budget Office into scoring taxes as something else. But Gruber did call the American public “stupid” enough to be misled by such linguistic tricks and by other measures in the ACA — for example, taxing health insurers knowing full well that insurers would pass the tax on to the insured.
During the hearing, Gruber apologized profusely and on multiple occasions for his remarks. Although at least some economists apparently see no warrant for such an apology, I believe it was appropriate, as in hindsight Gruber does as well. “Stupid” is entirely the wrong word in this context; Gruber should have said “ignorant” instead. Continue reading “Rethinking The Gruber Controversy: Americans Aren’t Stupid, But They’re Often Ignorant — And Why”
Filed Under: Economics, OP-ED, THCB
Tagged: American Voters, Economics, Gruber
Dec 30, 2014
In the giddy days after the passage of ACA, I was chatting to a PhD student in health economics. He was in love with the ACA. He kept repeating that it would reduce costs, increase quality and increase access. Nothing original. You know the sort of stuff you heard at keynotes of medical meetings; ‘Healthcare post Obamacare’ or ‘Radiology in the new era.’ Talks warning us that we were exiting the Cretaceous period.
He spoke about variation in healthcare, six sigma, fee-for-value and ‘paying doctors to do the right thing.’
‘How?’ I asked.
‘I just told you, we need to pay doctors for value and outcomes.’ He smugly replied.
‘How?’ I asked again.
He did not answer. Instead he gave me the look that one gives an utter imbecile who doesn’t know the difference between a polygon and a triangle. Continue reading “Grubernomics”
Filed Under: Economics, THCB
Tagged: ACA, Economics, Gruber, Obamacare
Nov 18, 2014
In the United States, the question has been asked time and again but never satisfactorily answered. By virtue of publically financed healthcare systems, the rest of the developed world has decided, to a greater or lesser extent, that medicine and healthcare are not pure businesses—that citizens have a right to care, even when they can’t pay all associated costs.
It’s starting to look like Americans won’t be able to duck the question for much longer.
In the last year, the profitability of U.S. hospitals eroded for the first time since the Great Recession, pushing some closer to and others over the solvency precipice. Revenues are down and costs are up. And these issues appear systemic and entrenched, giving rise to a series of important and relevant questions: How can hospitals adapt? If they do, will they still survive? And, do we as a nation think it’s important to make hospitals accessible, even if they lose money?
As recently reported in the New York Times, analysis by Moody’s Investors Service shows that this year nonprofit hospitals had their worst financial performance since the Great Recession. Among the 383 hospitals studied, revenue growth dipped from a 7 percent average to 3.9 percent on declining admissions. For the last two years, expenses have grown faster than revenues, and fully one quarter of all hospitals are operating at a loss.
In a word, Moody’s describes the situation as “unsustainable” because it is the product of what look like enduring realities:
- Private insurers did not increase payments to hospitals.
- Medicare reduced payments due to federal budget cuts.
- Demand for inpatient services declined as outpatient care options rose.
- Retail outpatient options now compete with hospital clinics.
- Patients with higher copays and deductibles chose not to seek care.
- Hospitals are buying up physician practices.
- The costs of electronic medical record systems are impacting the bottom line.
Continue reading “Is Healthcare a Business?”
Filed Under: THCB
Tagged: Economics, Electronic Medical Records, Inpatient, Moodys, Outpatient
Sep 9, 2014
What motivates a healthcare executive?
Remember Flower’s Laws of Behavioral Economics? The first two are:
- People do what you pay them to do.
- People do exactly what you pay them to do.
That is, it’s not general. It’s not “be a good doctor.” It’s more like, “Do lots of complex back fusion surgeries.” What’s more profitable gets done more.
I know that some people say that money has nothing to do with people’s motivation in healthcare, and that’s fine, I totally respect that opinion. You’re just in the wrong section. You want Aisle C, between Dr. Seuss and the Disney fairy tales.
But what about healthcare executives? What gets them more money? What constitutes hitting it into the cheap seats for them?
There are of course lots of compensation surveys. There’s a whole industry of people who do that. But they don’t tie compensation to anything specific. So when someone does a study that does look at correlations, that’s interesting information. One came out a few months ago in JAMA’s Internal Medicine .
Karen Joynt, MD, and her colleagues used 2009 data, so things might be beginning to change now. And they only looked at CEOs, so we will have to speculate whether the same things apply to other C-suite suits.
What did they find? They found great variation in the salaries, with a mean (average) salary of $595,781, a median (half are above and half below) of $404,938). The nearly $200,000 difference tells us that the sample is skewed by a smaller number of really large salaries at the top.
There is nothing surprising in the size of the salaries or their variation. That’s normal for any industry. No matter how much you might think that healthcare is special and different and sacred, it is nonetheless a very big business. In many or most towns, the hospitals and health systems are the biggest businesses in town. A typical suburban three-hospital system might have an annual budget in the $5 billion range.
What correlates with a higher salary? Size.
More beds means a higher salary ($550 for each extra bed, to be exact). Teaching status means $425,078 more — in other words, doubling the median. And most teaching hospitals are much bigger than average. Urban location gets you more, but this is likely also a marker for size, or the cliché phrase “big city hospital” wouldn’t roll off the tongue so easily. High tech gets you more, too. Hospitals with high technologic capabilities paid their CEOs $135,862 more than hospitals with low levels of technology — but this again is likely a marker (a co-variate) for size and teaching status.
Continue reading “So That’s What You Get The Big Bucks For?”
Filed Under: THCB, The Business of Health Care
Tagged: Economics, Executive compensation, Flower's Law of Behavioral Economics, Hospitals, JAMA Internal Medicine
Aug 14, 2014
When Michael injured his knee, he did what any responsible person would do. He was not incapacitated, and though the knee was painful and swollen, he could get around pretty well on it. So he waited a few days to see if it would get better. When it didn’t, he saw his primary care physician, who examined it and quite reasonably referred him to an orthopedic surgeon. The orthopedic surgeon considered ordering an MRI of the knee but worried that insurance would not cover a substantial portion of the $1,500 price tag, so he suggested a less expensive alternative: a six-week course of physical therapy that would cost only $600 – a quite responsible course of action.
At the end of this period of time, Michael was still experiencing pain and intermittent swelling. The orthopedic surgeon made another quite responsible decision and ordered the MRI exam, which showed a torn meniscus. The orthopedic surgeon could have recommended arthroscopic surgery, which would have earned him a handsome fee and generated revenue for his physician-owned surgery center. Instead he again acted quite responsibly, advising Michael that the surgery would actually increase the pain and swelling for a time and probably not improve his long-term outcome. Based on this advice, Michael declined surgery.
Though everyone in this case proceeded responsibly, the ultimate outcome was inefficient and costly. Many factors contributed, but perhaps the most important was the fact that Michael’s physician outlined choices based on an inaccurate understanding of the costs associated with his recommendations. The orthopedic surgeon thought that the cost of six weeks of physical therapy was 60% less than the MRI. In fact, however, the actual payment for the MRI from the insurance company would be only $300, not the “retail” price of $1,500. What appeared to be the less expensive option was actually twice as expensive, and it delayed definitive diagnosis by six weeks.
This story is emblematic of a larger problem in contemporary healthcare. No one – not the patients, the physicians, the hospitals, or the payers – really understands in a thorough way the true costs of their decisions. After receiving care, patients routinely receive by mail multi-page “explanations of benefits” that show huge differences between list prices and actual payments. Most find it baffling to try to determine who is paying how much for what. Physician practices and hospitals get calls every day from panicked patients who believe that they are being billed for exorbitant costs, when in fact most or all of the charges will be paid by insurance at a huge discount.
Continue reading “The Black Box at the Center of Health Economics”
Filed Under: THCB
Tagged: Costs, doctor/ patient relationship, Economics, Patients, Physicians, Richard Gunderman
Jan 25, 2014
A THCB reader in Virginia writes:
“As a small business owner, I’ve been following the arguments about Obamacare with a mixture of amusement and total horror. Just when you thought Washington couldn’t screw things up any worse, they find new and creative ways to do exactly that.
My question concerns the phenomenon of the “death spiral” the terrifying sounding scenario that observers predict will occur if not enough people buy insurance. According to this theory, if not enough people buy health insurance, insurers will be forced to abandon unprofitable markets. As a business owner myself, this argument resonates. But I still don’t get it. This seems like common sense.
It is certainly true that if nobody buys my goods and services, my business will go into a “death spiral.” I will no longer be able to make a living selling my widgets. I will be forced to invent a new widget. Or go get a new job. This is like my kid saying if he doesn’t to play more Call of Duty IV he will go into an “entertainment death spiral” and be unable to do his homework ever again or be a productive member of society.
Or McDonalds warning that if too many people take up vegetarianism, its business will go into a horrible “hamburger death spiral.” So what evidence do we have? I need documentation. Like, let’s say, a picture. Or a YouTube clip.
Seriously, when has this happened? Otherwise, the death spiral thing sounds like really good economic spin to me …”
Filed Under: ACA Database, THCB
Tagged: Death Spirals, Economics, health economics, THCBist
Jan 24, 2014
We will be blunt. Hidden under the cloak of expanding health insurance, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) has fostered a massive subsidization of healthcare goods and services.
These subsidies often have little or anything to do with what economists would consider the “insurance” part of health insurance – providing protection against financial catastrophe.
Perhaps more troubling, if the past is prologue these subsidies will continue to grow, transferring huge amounts of money to politically favored groups and doing very little to decrease aggregate health spending – a presumed goal of health reform.
In order to understand these claims, it is necessary to take a step back and explain why insurance (of any form) is a good thing in the first place. Simply stated, insurance provides individuals with protection against unpredictable financial hardships not of their own making.
Most of us don’t like risk, and therefore we are willing to pay other people to avoid uncertain outcomes. Therefore the benefits of insurance are to protect us from uncertain events.
The key here is the uncertainty. If something is not going to cause financial distress, or the expense is relatively predictable, then, by definition, the service is not insurable. A health plan could cover the service, but that is a subsidy, i.e. other people in the insurance pool or an outside actor such as the government are simply paying for your service. It is not insurance.
Sadly, most of the discussion around what constitutes “real” health insurance under the ACA bears only a passing resemblance to the protection against financial risk that is the hallmark of insurance. For example, Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius said: “Some of these folks have very high catastrophic plans that don’t pay for anything unless you get hit by a bus … They’re really mortgage protection, not health insurance.”
What does Secretary Sebelius think insurance is? We don’t expect auto insurance to pay for our gasoline.
Continue reading “The ACA: When Insurance Isn’t Insurance”
Filed Under: Economics, THCB
Tagged: Craig Garthwaite, David Dranove, Economics, The ACA
Jan 21, 2014
Risk adjustment is a key mechanism to ensuring appropriate payments for Medicare Advantage plans, Medicare Part D drug plans, and Medicaid health plans. Since health plans vary in their mix of healthy and sick enrollees, risk adjustment modifies premium payments to better reflect the projected costs of members served and compensate plans that enroll high-cost patients.
Historically, risk adjustment was only used in Medicaid and Medicare – in effect, redistributing some revenue from health or drug plans with a relatively healthier mix of members to those plans with a more costly enrollment profile. However, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extends risk adjustment to the individual and small group health insurance markets starting in 2014.
A new brief from The Synthesis Project tackles the issue and makes several interesting recommendations for how to improve risk adjustment methods for the post-ACA market. Without accurate risk adjustment, health plans have a strong financial incentive to seek out only the healthiest enrollees, especially under ACA-mandated adjusted community rating. Under adjusted community rating, health plans may not vary premiums based on health status or sex and are limited in how much they may vary premiums based on age. Under ACA, the healthy, the young, and men subsidize the health costs of the unhealthy, the older, and women.
Risk adjustment is therefore a necessary factor in stabilizing the dramatically new post-ACA health insurance marketplace, particularly the new Health Insurance Exchanges. Even then, the ACA is a giant game of musical chairs. The market under ACA will be chaotic and challenging, with a mix of winners and losers once the music stops and the dust settles, which will take at least three to five years.
Continue reading “How Health Plan Risk Adjustment Models May Change Under the ACA”
Filed Under: Economics, THCB
Tagged: Economics, Health Insurance Exchanges, Kip Piper, Risk adjustment, Synthesis Project, The ACA, Upcoding
Jan 3, 2014
As the health insurance exchanges find their footing and potentially millions of Americans gain access to insurance, this may be a good time to step back and take a longer term view of the ACA. When you get down to it, expanding health insurance coverage was the easiest and least controversial part of health reform. There is no shortage of ways to expand health coverage and almost any credible health reform proposal would have done the job, provided enough money was thrown at the problem.
In designing the ACA, perhaps as a result of political pressure, President Obama opted for a combination of heavily subsidized individual insurance exchanges and generous expansions of Medicaid. Freed from political constraints, he might have instead pushed for the single payer system that many of his most ardent supporters desired. Republicans inclined to expand coverage (at least one of us is proof that unlike the unicorn these do exist) might have pushed for a pure voucher program that harnessed market forces.
All of these options would expand coverage to the degree that policymakers were willing to fund them. So while we congratulate the President for his political success (we doubt the other options could have made it through Congress), it is a simplistic mistake to evaluate the implementation of the ACA by counting the numbers of uninsured or waiting for the monthly updates on the enrollment figures from the exchanges website. Any regulator with a big enough purse can, in the fullness of time, expand access. Frankly, that’s the “easy” part of healthcare reform.
But what about the other elements of the so-called “triple aim” of health reform: cost and quality? You see, while we agree that liberal, moderate, and conservative health reforms can all improve coverage, they each will have very different effects on the other important outcomes. Consider for example the oft-discussed “Medicare for all”; i.e. a single payer system. This would increase access without the messiness of the exchanges. It would also allow the government to flex its monopsonistic muscles and quickly reduce costs – though likely at the expense of quality. In contrast, relying on markets may not reduce costs in the short run, and may not necessarily reward real quality (though it has a better short than single payer in this regard).
Evaluating health reform in the context of the “Triple Aim” is important, but even that approach is not nearly enough. There is a broad consensus among that technological change is the most important long run driver of cost and quality. It follows that the most important element of health reform is its impact on technological change.
To understand how technological change affects all of us, consider the profound impact of the top ten medical advances in the last ten years, as listed by CNN:
1. Sequencing the human genome
2. Stem cell research
3. HIV cocktails
4. Targeted cancer therapies.
5. Laparoscopic surgery
Continue reading “What We Don’t Know Can Hurt Us”
Filed Under: OP-ED, THCB
Tagged: Costs, Craig Garthwaite, David Dranove, Economics, health reform, The ACA, Triple Aim
Dec 18, 2013