I am coauthoring (with Cory Capps) a chapter on healthcare antitrust for the forthcoming International Handbook of Antitrust Economics. As we finish our first draft, we were searching for a good way to tie everything together. We both thought of concluding by discussing antitrust and ACOs. Cory and I believe that the underappreciated (and often excruciatingly boring) topic of antitrust is fully interwoven with the story of ACOs. And even if the Supreme Court strikes down the ACA (note to readers of my prior blog – I was just kidding), ACOs may endure. So this is as good a time as any to explain the connections between antitrust and ACOs.
I first recognized this connection twenty years ago, when my colleague Steve Shortell was touting the growth of integrated delivery systems. Steve even offered a universal health insurance proposal (which several states explored) built around competing IDSs. In Steve’s world, an IDS would consist of several hospitals and hundreds of physicians. I argued with Steve that economic theory provided little support for massive vertical integration (and theory is still not all that kind to the idea.) I granted Steve that if integration made theoretical sense, integration would be all well and good for Chicago, where there might be four or five competing IDS. But what about Milwaukee, Cleveland, or any number of other midsize metropolitan areas? They would do well to have two or three IDS. Indeed, even with a legislative mandate to form IDS, consolidation has left these and other midsize markets with just two or three health systems. Smaller metro areas might have only had one IDS.

The most over-used and under-analyzed statement in the academic vocabulary is surely “more research is needed”.

Any day now the Supreme Court will issue its opinion on the constitutionality of the Accountable Care Act, which even the White House now calls Obamacare.
LeBron James exploded past his defender and raced towards the lane.
