Every day, 10,000 people in the U.S. celebrate their 65th birthday, making each one of these seniors eligible for Medicare. The very program that gives America’s seniors access to affordable health care will turn a youngish 48 on July 30, but in a biting irony, it could go bankrupt before reaching its 65th birthday.
We cannot wish away or ignore the reality that Medicare’s Part A trust fund — the portion that pays hospital claims — is currently projected to run out of money by 2026. The good news, however, is that it is possible to put Medicare on a sustainable path if we can surmount current political hurdles.
It is no secret that Washington is better known for what it is not doing than what it is doing these days. Partisan gridlock has proved to be an insurmountable impasse for potentially worthy legislative efforts. This is especially true when it comes to making the changes needed to sustain Medicare’s future, where Washington is truly making things much harder than they need to be.
Much of the current debate has focused on reforms that would only slightly defer Medicare’s pending insolvency, with the potential for mere cost-shifting. With many of those recommendations, political disagreement is so strong that an extremely limited chance exists to pass a compromise version. However, even if enacted, these reforms would only address the symptoms of Medicare’s condition rather than the underlying problem. The result would only help Medicare limp to its 65th birthday at best.
There is a much more meaningful reform out there that addresses the underlying problem, and, surprisingly, bipartisan consensus exists around the need to end the fee-for-service system in Medicare.
The current fee-for-service payment system compensates physicians and other health care providers for each service they deliver, such as an office visit, test or other procedure. While it is critical that providers be fairly compensated, Medicare’s fee-for-service structure contributes to inefficient care that is often disconnected with actual patient outcomes. It has accelerated the program’s financial imbalance with inflationary spending that has little or no connection to helping beneficiaries get healthier. Continue reading…
The Supreme Court has upheld the Affordable Care Act (ACA), a frustrating situation in which conservatives won the policy battle, but lost the war over the Act. In particular, the Court held that Congress cannot use the Commerce clause to compel commerce. The individual mandate qua mandate is unconstitutional. However, the Congress has the right to impose taxes (if not punitive and excessive), which permits the Obama administration to add a tax on millions of uninsured Americans in addition to the ACA’s already-massive tax burden on the middle class.
The Court ruled that a Medicaid expansion could be an unconstitutional federal coercion of the states, but this expansion does not have a penalty large enough to pass that threshold. Interestingly, the Court opened up the possibility that governors could refuse the Medicaid expansion. Those same individuals would then be eligible for subsidies in the exchanges. If all the governors refused the expansion, and if individuals take up subsidized insurance the federal cost heads even farther north.
In a bit of a pyrrhic victory, the Forum’s amicus briefs, signed by over 200 economists, were cited twice in the Court’s dissenting opinion. (See my amicus brief.)
The field of play now shifts from a legal battle to a policy debate. In addition to the Court’s endorsement of the policy foundations of the challenge to the ACA, the fundamental policy flaws remain.
Rewarding quality health plans is an admirable goal for the Medicare Advantage program. Unfortunately, the current system of linking star ratings to bonus payments and rebate adjustments instituted by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (and expanded by the CMS Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration) fails to achieve that goal, and depending on its specific implementation, may even be counterproductive.
Because criteria for evaluation are not published until after the period for which performance will be evaluated, there is no possibility that MA plans will be able to improve their performance to achieve the goals CMS intends to incentivize. Any adjustment plans will be able to make to their bids or plan offerings would have to be aimed at increasing enrollment in counties with the highest bonuses and rebates based on data from performance in previous years, possibly at the expense of improving their performance in the future.
The system rewards beneficiaries for choosing those plans favored by the selected CMS criteria, rather than the plans that best meet their needs. In effect patients whose preferences, health status, and even counties of residence, don’t match the CMS model of a highly rated plan will be at a disadvantage. Simultaneously, the system will likely reduce the scope of choice available to MA-eligible beneficiaries, and reduce competition among MA plans.
Finally, the system rewards beneficiaries for living in counties with low poverty rates (since relatively wealthier counties tend to have more plans with higher ratings), thus adversely impacting poor beneficiaries even more than non-poor beneficiaries.
These impacts are inconsistent with the overall policy purpose. The goal of incentivizing quality health plans is legitimate and admirable; that goal will not be achieved by the rating structure currently being put into place.
During the original debate over the Affordable Care Act, I wrote that the proposed law failed to address out-of-control Medicare spending. Two years later, this urgent problem remains.
Medicare is awash in a sea of red ink — $280 billion in cash flow deficits already and getting worse — that is driving the U.S. credit rating south and threatening the very foundations of the U.S. economy. It makes no sense to sit idly by while the social safety net unravels and the promise of our future dims.
Advocates argue the health care law solves this problem. Specifically, it creates the Independent Payment and Advisory Board, which will be formed in 2014 and could make its first recommendations in 2015. This advisory board will consist of 15 officials appointed by the president. Board members will be required to make recommendations to cut Medicare funding in years when spending growth exceeds targeted rates. For Congress to block these recommendations, it must veto the board’s proposal with a 60 percent majority and pass alternative cuts of the same size.
In other words, this board puts Medicare on a budgetary diet. What’s wrong with that?
First, the system is clearly set up so that the advisory board, rather than Congress, makes the policy choices about Medicare. This means that the IPAB is not just an advisory body — despite its name. And policy choices, which should be made by elected representatives, are not.
Second, the advisory board threatens the quality of patient care. It can, in essence, ration the health care available to seniors. While technically prohibited from directly altering Medicare benefits, the IPAB will have no choice but to attempt to ratchet back spending by slashing providers’ reimbursement rates.