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Five Truths About Health Insurance: Public, Private, or Cooperative

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In the debate over whether health reform legislation should include a public plan or cooperative, too much has been said about the general objectives of such an approach – expanded choice, level playing field, benchmark for competition, etc. – and too little has been said about the specific objectives of such an approach – affordable premiums, high quality care, accountability.  Here are five specific truths about any insurance plan, private, public, or cooperative.  The reform debate must reconcile itself to these truths.

First, health plans succeed when they attract and retain members.  People join a health insurance plan because it meets their needs for cost, quality, access, and satisfaction.  Is the premium affordable, and are the copayments manageable?  Does the plan have a high-quality network of providers?  Will I have to wait to see a specialist? Will I be subject to a number of complicated rules and requirements?   Ultimately, a public plan or cooperative will succeed or fail based on consumers’ perception of the plan’s value proposition.

Second, to make the premiums affordable, the cost of medical care needs to be affordable.  All health plans must find a way to manage medical spending, and there are only three ways to manage spending:  reduce the amount paid to providers; reduce the volume of services through utilization controls or provider payments that encourage efficiency; or contract only with efficient providers who deliver high-quality, low-cost care.  A public plan or cooperative will need to decide how it manages payment levels, volume, and contracted providers.

Third, any health insurance plan needs to establish a payment strategy for providers.  Most private plans negotiate individual rates for each hospital and physician, with some beginning to experiment with bundles of services and episodes of care.  Medicare and Medicaid set payment levels through legislation and regulation.  A public plan or cooperative faces a critical choice:  reliance on negotiation or base payments on some fraction or multiple of existing Medicare rates.  Under the former strategy, a public plan or cooperative would face significant operational challenges in contracting successfully with adequate numbers of willing providers; under the latter, the public plan or cooperative faces significant resistance from physicians and hospitals, many of whom may decline to participate at payment levels they deem inadequate.

Fourth, health plans struggle to manage the volume of services provided to consumers.  Because total spending equals price multiplied by quantity, managing volume is critical to affordable premiums.  Medicare has never managed volume, instead relying on payment levels alone to control overall cost.  Private plans employ a mix of strategies to manage volume, including explicit controls using nurses to approve or deny requested services, as well as implicit controls, such as paying capitated rates, which require providers to manage to a fixed budget.  A public plan or cooperative will either embrace the private sector’s volume control strategies or limit itself to managing cost using only price levers.

Fifth, insurance plans that attract high-quality, highly efficient hospitals and physicians tend to offer lower premiums than those that contract with all providers.  Many private plans seek to steer patients to the high-quality, lower- cost providers in their networks.  A public plan or cooperative will need either to limit its network to high-quality, efficient providers or open its doors to all comers.  Either choice is challenging:  contracting with some but not all providers implies a degree of selectivity that would create a number of due process issues for a public plan; contracting with everyone makes it more difficult for the public plan to offer affordable premiums.

Expanding access to an additional 50 million Americans requires affordable insurance options, which requires managing medical costs.  These costs are determined by the interaction of the payment for a given service, the number of those services provided, and the quality and efficiency of the providers delivering care.  Private plan proponents, public plan proponents, and those advocating for a cooperative plan approach alike must answer three fundamental questions:

  1. Will the plan set payment levels for providers via negotiation or fiat?
  2. How will the plan influence the volume of services provided?
  3. How does the plan contract with efficient providers?

Answered, these three questions have the potential to clarify the debate and discussion over what kinds of health plans should be offered to Americans; unasked and unanswered, we will continue to talk past one another as the clock ticks.

Jon Glaudemans, Senior Vice President at Avalere Health, is an expert on a wide array of Medicare, Medicaid, and hospital/plan issues. Jon has more than 25 years of senior leadership experience in health insurance, managed care, policy issues management, and public affairs.  In his various professional engagements, Jon has worked closely with boards of directors, hospital chief executive officers, and key corporate and public sector leaders to develop and implement business strategies and public policy reforms designed to improve healthcare delivery and financing at the national, state, and local levels. Jon holds a B.A. in Political Science from M.I.T. and a M.P.A. in Economics from Princeton University.

Back to the Drawing Board?

Roger collier

The current congressional approach
to health care reform of adding ever more fixes without changing the
underlying system looks increasingly shaky. 

What are the some of the indications? 

  1. The public plan has generated
    enormous opposition—and not just from insurers. Whether anyone believes
    that a Medicare clone would reduce under-65 health care costs or not,
    it is unlikely that a final reform bill will include anything other
    than a weak compromise.

Continue reading…

Ezra says pusillanimousity has won

Now he’s no longer a young punk but an insider of the first order Ezra Klein has come up trumps and got an early copy of the latest Senate Finance committee legislation/trial balloon. It’s not going to make the left happy. In order to ratchet down from the $1.3 billion CBO said that their earlier version was going to cost, the Committee has basically taken out the public plan option, cut back the amount of subsidies, and are relying on what looks like an increasingly unenforceable individual mandate.

Now admittedly this is where I said Obama would end up more than 18 months ago. But, given that with the recession we really had a chance to do something here, this is very very weak.

I got a call from Organizing for America (Obama’s grass roots organization) asking me to support the reform bill the other day. This one is barely worth passing. We might be better off leaving the system and having a proper collapse before we start again in the next recession (which at the rate we’re going might be this one).

It’s looking increasingly like the Democrats on the Committee got rolled, and didn’t even care about that. Perhaps they felt that the risk of passage of something significant was greater than the risk of a quick loss of legislation that no one could get behind anyway.

I’m not allowed to call the Democrats a certain word beginning with P any more (even if John Stewart uses it all the time). But I can call them pusillanimous. And in your treat for the evening, here’s Marina from HotForWords to explain what that means.

Matthew went to Redmond, Pt 4: Nate McLemore

My final interview from my trip to Microsoft was with Nate McLemore, who is Director of Business Development for the Health Solutions Group and also involved in Microsoft’s policy & lobbying work. Nate talked about Microsoft’s role in the ongoing deliberations on meaningful use, ARRA and all that.

We Need Southwest Airlines!

Roger Collier

Can price competition cut health care costs? There are lessons to be learned from the airline industry.

Over thirty years, per capita health care costs, adjusted for inflation, have increased two and a half times. In the same period, despite a doubling of fuel prices, airline fares have fallen by more than half.

Why the five-fold disparity?

It’s obvious the two industries have followed very different paths. While airline travel has become an experience of packed planes, crowded airports, and peanuts (or less) meal service, health care has seen dramatic advances. Treatments that a few years ago seemed unimaginable are now commonplace: heart transplants, anti-depression drugs, artificial joints, laparoscopic surgery using miniature television cameras, and—of course—Viagra.

That’s only part of the story, though. While air travel is now safer and more convenient, with more frequent flights to more destinations, health care in some communities is so inadequate that morbidity and mortality rates are comparable to those of third world countries.

Why have airlines been apparently so much more successful in giving value for money?

Led by Southwest, the airlines that sprung up after deregulation recognized that individual flyers were price-sensitive, and cut their costs accordingly. They faced barriers, though, many of them analogous to those in today’s health care system. Business travelers flying on their employers’ nickel resisted efforts to move them to crowded peanut-only flights, frequent flyers resisted having to switch from their favorite mileage plan to that of another airline network, and travel agents much preferred to send their customers on airlines paying higher commissions.

Southwest and its peers succeeded by marketing directly to the public, through relentless emphasis on lower fares, and by maintaining standards that were, if not luxurious, acceptable to travelers. Few businesses are now sympathetic to employees’ preferences for more comfortable higher-cost flights, frequent travelers have adapted to low-cost airlines’ mileage programs, and travel agents and their commissions are almost a thing of the past.

And now, just as Southwest Airlines travelers found that they reached their destinations as reliably—if not quite as comfortably—as before, so recent studies have shown that there is little or no relationship, within the range of acceptable medical standards, between health care costs and quality.

So, what must health care reform do to emulate Southwest Airlines’ effect on fares?

First, just as deregulation ended most legacy airlines’ government subsidies, the tax exemption for employer-paid insurance should be reduced or eliminated.  Not only is the $300 billion a year tax subsidy needed to help pay for reform, but cutting the exemption will discourage overly-generous coverage and remove the inequity between employer-paid and individual-paid insurance.

Second, just as travelers can compare airlines’ fares for the same itinerary using Orbitz or Expedia, insurers should be required to price the same basic benefits, perhaps through insurance exchanges. Supplemental benefits could be offered and separately priced, but being able to compare prices for the same basic coverage is essential.

Third, just as individuals purchase most airline tickets, so individuals should be responsible for choosing insurance to meet their own needs. In practice, this implies subsidies for the lower-income, and perhaps also some form of voucher model to facilitate the process. It may be appropriate, however, to allow self-insuring companies to continue to provide employee coverage since, with no insurer risk or profit involved, they typically provide better value.

Fourth, just as airlines’ pay is negotiated only with their own unions—not with every airline union in each airport—so there should be more effective constraints on provider monopolies in which specialists in an area group together to control prices.

Emulating Southwest Airlines won’t result in the cost of health care falling by half, but it offers a far more promising approach to cost control than the expensive band-aid solutions, superimposed on the worst features of our present system, apparently preferred by congressional committees.

Roger Collier was formerly CEO of a national health care consulting firm. His experience includes the design and implementation of innovative health care programs for HMOs, health insurers, and state and federal agencies. He is editor of Health Care REFORM UPDATE [reformupdate.blogspot.com].

Meaningful meaning? (with UPDATE)

6a00d8341c909d53ef0105371fd47b970b-320wiThe first draft of “meaningful use” came out early yesterday, and I was struck by two things. First, probably influenced by the NCVHS recommendations and the Consumer Partnership for e-Health (See Update), the work-group included a lot of consumer-facing aspects in the concept of meaningful use. Here’s the full draft. Comments are being accepted now (but hurry as they’re going to come back with version two in a month, you have 9 days!).

But in terms of getting consumer activities into the 2011 definition the “Objectives” suggest that meaningful use includes:

  • Providing patients with electronic copy of or electronic access to clinical information (labs, medication list, allergies, medical “problem” list)
  • Providing access to patient specific educational sources
  • Providing clinical summaries for patients at each encounterContinue reading…

What Technology is Needed to Improve Care: EHRs or Registries?

RS Head Shot 1

I spent a couple of days last week (June 10-11) at a conference co-sponsored by the HRSA Center for Quality and the NIH National Center on Minority Health and Health Disparities at which twenty of the highest-performing community health centers from the HRSA’s long-running Health Disparities Collaboratives (HDCs) described their accomplishments in improving primary care. They were stunning.

These health centers were not fresh-faced newcomers to the improvement collaborative du jour, but rather grizzled veterans who joined the HDCs ten years ago, have stuck with the method, and by now have embedded quality improvement deeply into their day-to-day operations and organizational culture.

If ever there could be a vivid demonstration of what is possible and right in the future of American primary care, this was it. Consider:

  • At CareSouth in South Carolina, under the leadership of Ann Lewis, the annual average cost of care for a diabetes patient is $343, compared with $1591 at comparable community providers in SC. Outcomes for these 3500 diabetes patients have improved steadily, with 50% of HbA1c’s less than 7.0. Appointments are available within 2 days. Staff turnover at CareSouth is 3%.
  • At FamilyCare in West Virginia, CEO Martha Carter has overseen a steady, radical improvement in diabetes care. Since 2002, the diabetes panel has increased from 1000 to 2700 while at the same time their average HbA1c has dropped from 7.8% to 7.1%. In the same period, the percent of pediatric patients with ER visits in the previous 6 months declined from 70% to 6%.

As team after team presented their stories, it became clear that these results were being achieved by safety net organizations on shoestring budgets, with highest-risk populations, despite the extra burdens of improvement work, data management and reporting. At La Clinica de la Raza in Oakland California, since 2007 100% of persistent asthmatics have been on controller medications. At Holyoke Health Center in Massachusetts the percent of diabetic patients with HbA1c’s over 10 has declined from 29% to 10% since 2000. At Hunts Point-Mott Haven in New York City, asthma hospitalization rates have decreased by 58% since 1997.

Together, these CHC leaders described a radically transformed model of primary care based on a fundamental change in attitude: instead of caring for patients ‘one at a time,’ they have accepted responsibility for a population of patients, based their criteria for quality on measures of the whole population, and persistently sought ways to improve those measures.

All of these high-performing health centers relied on information technology to achieve and measure results. But they referred to their systems as ‘registries’ – not as ‘electronic health records’ or ‘EMRs’.

EHRs versus Registries? – Lets Talk About Functions Instead

Despite the ever-present risk of oversimplifying a complex issue, and without worrying too much about what is really an EHR or a registry, let’s try to sidestep the controversy and focus instead on the software functionality that is needed to support the new model of primary care, as illustrated by these high-performing community health centers.

Today’s discussions of EHRs typically center on a relatively narrow range of functions that support the ‘one-at-a-time’ model of care: storing and displaying patient-specific clinical information at the point of care, reminding providers of the care needed by a patient during a visit, increasing the reliability and safety of common processes such as ordering tests and prescribing medications. When patient data can be readily shared among providers, these benefits are amplified across the continuum of care. These functions are important, but are only part what is needed to improve quality.

The registry functions described by high performing CHCs focus on using data to directly monitor and improve care for a population. We can distinguish two broad levels of registry functionality.

‘Base level’ registry functions are the starting point for practices working on quality improvement and are widely familiar to those participating in improvement collaboratives. They include:

  • Planning care for individual patients in advance of an office visit, based on evidence-based protocols
  • Providing ‘opportunistic’ care – that is, take every opportunity to provide care, even if it is not the reason for the visit
  • Tracking quality indicators  (for example, the percentage of diabetic patients with current eye exams) to evaluate effectiveness  of process improvements
  • Identifying gaps in performance to prioritize process improvements

The high performing CHCs who presented at the HRSA/NIH conference, many with over 10 years of experience in sustained care improvement, described uses of their registries that extend far beyond either EHRs or base-level registry functions. Advanced registry functions mentioned by these teams include the ability to

  • Stratify patients by severity in order to target planned care (for example, patients with DM with a recent increase/decrease in BMI)
  • Provide patient-specific outreach reminders to patients for needed care
  • Create individual patient care plans with goals, track patient progress against the plan, and identify subgroups of patients based plan progress
  • Identify subpopulations (by gender, age, geographic area) to differentiate process improvement interventions
  • Identify subpopulations with special needs to launch community-wide campaigns (e.g. high utilizers with no insurance and special needs)
  • Provide ubiquitous performance feedback to motivate providers and staff
  • Identify groups of ‘non-compliant’ patients to diagnose causes and target interventions such as promotora, case management, or group visits
  • Organize, coordinate and schedule ancillary and community-based services
  • Create and manage provider panels
  • Deliver transparent provider-specific feedback to encourage productive competition
  • Identify patients for clinical trials
  • Distribute a newsletter to all families in the practice that includes current performance data
  • Summarize utilization improvement and cost savings for negotiations with payers and networks, and to obtain grant funding

HITEP or Mis-Step?

As I listened to the conference presentations, I scribbled notes. I was pushing a deadline to respond to a Request For Comments from the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) [http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-12419.pdf ] regarding a proposed ‘Health Information Technology Extension Program’ (HITEP). This program, fueled by $2B of stimulus funds, envisions a national network of ‘Health Information Technology Regional Extension Centers’ which will employ ‘extension agents’ to coach providers on the selection, implementation and ‘meaningful use’ [whatever that means] of certified EHRs.

Parsing the RFC during coffee breaks, I was struck by the disconnect between the ‘silver bullet’ overtones of the ONC’s vision of EHRs everywhere, and the dogged improvement work being carried out by the CHCs presenting their results to the audience of HHS personnel and health services researchers.

I was also struck by the fact that no ONC staff attended the meeting, although many agencies across HHS were represented. So I fear that the message about the software functions that are so ‘meaningful’ for quality improvement will go unheard as HITEP is put into play.

As I was leaving the conference I talked to a physician leader of one of the CHCs who was in charge of his center’s EHR adoption project. His center has been a long-standing user of registry software and has accomplished dramatic improvements in care. Their group adopted an EHR product based primarily on it customizability, and he has personally spent half of his time for the past two years reshaping the EHR software to support the registry functions that his practice has come to rely on.

More than ever, I am fearful that the ONC is pushing technology for technology’s sake, without thinking through the software functions that are actually needed by the providers who are pioneering the transformation of primary care.

ehrRichard Scoville, PhD, is an independent consultant specializing in healthcare quality improvement and performance measurement. He is an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Health Policy and Administration at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill where he teaches courses in healthcare quality improvement and informatics. He serves as an improvement advisor to the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, NICHQ, the Cincinnati Children’s Hospital Medical Center, and the Federal Health Resources and Services Administration on a range of collaborative improvement and systems design projects.

Rant: THCB transforms the New York Times, makes offer!

6a00d8341c909d53ef0105371fd47b970b-320wi Just a few years ago The New York Times was on its last legs, printing Judy Miller’s re-mouthing of Cheney’s lies, holding back the wiretapping story until after the 2004 election, and generally spouting a lot of rubbish about health care.

Somehow the leadership there looked to THCB for inspiration.

Continue reading…

Op-Ed: On Health Reform, Obama Faces a New Foe: Other Democrats

Harris Meyer Democratic Senator Maria Cantwell of Washington is a prime reason President Obama will have a hard time getting health care reform passed this year. Let me explain this seeming oddity. At a news conference on May 27 in Yakima, Wa., the purportedly liberal Cantwell, who represents a state that voted 58 percent for Obama, announced her support for two new, bipartisan bills that would advance a key goal of Obama’s reforms — increasing access to primary care physicians and other doctors who are in short supply. As Massachusetts has discovered, making sure nearly everyone has health insurance doesn’t help if there aren’t enough doctors to take care of them.

The two bills Cantwell endorsed feature provisions that would cost the federal government billions of dollars a year — scholarships and loan forgiveness for medical students who serve in shortage areas, increased funding for the National Health Service Corps, higher Medicare payments to primary care doctors, more Medicare funding for resident physician training, interest-free loans for hospitals starting new residency training programs, etc.Continue reading…

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