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What India’s Teleradiology Market Teaches Us About the Future of Medicine

Teleradiology has the same effect on radiologists as Lord Voldemort has on Muggles. It’s the feared end point of the commoditization of imaging, with Rajeev in Bangalore outpricing Rajeev in Chicago for reading follow-up CTs for lung nodules.

But despite the fears of U.S. radiologists, their counterparts in India have more pressing things on their mind.

“U.S. radiologists think that Indian radiologists are [itching] to steal their jobs. We have plenty of work in India,” reassured Dr. Sumer Sethi, director of TeleRad Providers of New Delhi.

A tech-savvy blogger, Sethi founded TeleRad Providers in a flash of inspiration and an appreciation of market forces.

“There is unimaginable competition in private medical imaging in New Delhi,” he said.

A new radiologist wishing to set up shop in one of India’s metropolitan areas faces large upfront costs: There is little discount for a 1.5-tesla MRI scanner. This means one must have abundant spare change floating around — or ancestral wealth. And once the shop is set up, the aspiring radiology entrepreneur embarks on a long and uncertain road toward establishing reputation and market share.

Employment models in the U.S., such as partnership tracks and buying into a practice, are not generally available to Indian radiologists. The alternative to entrepreneurship is working as a salaried employee for a corporate hospital, private imaging center, or government hospital. That was not the career pathway for Sethi, whose teleradiology practice is a pure fee-for-service model.

“It’s a low-cost operation,” he explained. “We read from home.”

An elegant model

The costs of an Indian teleradiologist are certainly low. Sethi does not have to deal with intermediary agents. There are no concerns about using the wrong billing code, and there are no separate state licenses to acquire. The model is elegant in its simplicity. He gets a study, renders a report, and gets paid.

However, the low operating costs belie the actual effort that is required of Sethi to grow his practice. He negotiates with hospitals directly. Being an entrepreneur means recognizing the need for teleradiology, and persuading others of the need and its solution.

Most of Sethi’s clients are hospitals in tier 2 and tier 3 cities in India, the equivalent of Dayton, OH. The hospitals have the machines and patients but not always the radiologists.

“We mostly plug the gaps in the rota at these places,” Sethi said.

This must mean that the radiologists at these centers welcome his efforts, I surmised.

“The scrutiny of our reports is intense,” he said. “This does not mean all our reports are overread. But were we to miss something, we could lose the contract, as the local radiologists would say, ‘See, this is a report from a teleradiologist.’ I tell my team that we must be at the top of our game, always.”

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How to Out-Argue Your Doctor with Data

Your doctor believes he’s “patient-centered” because he wants to provide the the treatment he thinks you need as quickly as possible. Or as the fictional Dr. Heart tells his chest pain patient right after recommending a stent, “As it happens, I can do the procedure for you next week. Does that work for you?”

Before giving in to the gurney, what questions should patients ask? One data-driven script was presented in skit form at the recent Health Datapalooza 2015 meeting in Washington, D.C. The drama was light-hearted; the clinical and financial issues underlying it are not.

Dr. Heart was played by Glyn Elwyn, a theater student-turned-family practitioner recognized as one of the world’s leading researchers in patient preferences and values. Casey Quinlan, a writer and activist widely known for her unfiltered expression of those preferences and values, played the patient.

In the skit, a persistent Quinlan keeps pestering the doctor with questions about what a stent will accomplish that changing her medications won’t. At first glance, a stent sounds appealing because it props open the blood vessel. What could be better? However, when Quinlan asks directly about the effect of meds versus stenting on preventing a heart attack, the doctor admits that data show medication lowers the odds but stenting does not.

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HIT Newser: Will Stage 3 Meaningful Use Be Delayed?

CMS Releases Final Update to ACO Program

CMS releases a final rule updating the Medicare Shared Savings Program, which includes a new higher-risk, higher-reward Track 3 option; streamlines data sharing between CMS and ACOs; and adds a requirement that ACOs applying for the program describe how they will promote the use of health IT to boost care coordination.

Organizations Urge Stage 3 Delay

The AMA and MGMA join the AHA and CHIME in calling for a delay in finalizing Stage 3 Meaningful Use requirements. The current version is largely viewed as too burdensome for providers with the potential to impede the use of health IT to improve quality and efficiency.

Quite simply, Stage 3 will not be successful without provider buy-in. There have been delays before; look for another oneContinue reading…

Productivity? In Healthcare?

Obamacare is built on the assumption that healthcare can be more productive, that we can squeeze more health per dollar out to the system that is built to give it to us. Practically everything I write is based on the same idea — big time. I believe we could do healthcare better for half the money we pour into it now.

There is a widely-cited theory that this is fundamentally impossible, popularized by William Baumol, a New York University economist, in a 2012 book, The Cost Disease: Why Computers Get Cheaper and Health Care Doesn’t. Baumol trades on the idea that healthcare is mostly the individual labor of highly trained professionals (doctors, nurses, and technicians) whose labor cannot simply be baked into machines and software. So we can’t expect healthcare to become any more productive, especially as healthcare keeps getting more complex.

We can’t both be right. What’s the daylight between these two radically different points of view?

I believe that the Baumol argument assumes many things that are simply not true. These include:

o  We are using doctors and other personnel at their highest and best use (when in fact we waste masses of clinician time on documentation and other processes that do not add value at all, let alone value that only they could add)

o  The goal against which productivity should be measured is provision of healthcare processes, such as how efficiently one can do a gall bladder removal or an uncomplicated birth (as against, say, improvement in health of patients and patient populations)

o  There is not much wasted motion within those processes (when in fact there is a great deal wasted, as anyone who has applied lean manufacturing principles to healthcare processes has discovered)

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How I Built a Health App In Six Hours, Got 2.3 Million Downloads and Got Acquired

Creating A Story

Rewind back to May 2013 and I was co-founder of a music app startup called Discovr. We had managed to achieve over 4 million downloads, raised over $1m and were perceived as ‘successful’ (unfortunately things didn’t end up that way) in our home town of Perth, Australia.

It was very common for people to come up to me and ask what the magic was to make a successful app. We’d fudged our way through and somehow made something people wanted to download, but could I recreate it?

I was lucky enough to be reading an advance copy of the amazing book The Fortune Cookie Principle which really opened my eyes to storytelling and products.

I was also inspired by reading this advice from the One More Thing conference about how to write a press release. Surely it’s impossible to stand out with a press release like that?

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A Few Thoughts on “Culture” in Healthcare

The big news in Boston healthcare last month was the announcement that Tufts and Boston University Medical Centers were calling off their proposed merger.  The Boston Globe wrote:

“Although they did not specify why the deal fell apart, the hospitals were apparently unable to overcome differences in culture, mission, and strategies for the future, analysts said. Culture always trumps strategy,”said Ellen Lutch Bender, president of the consulting firm Bender Strategies LLC.

I don’t know any of the details about the proposed merger, and certainly can’t tell you if the deal made sense.  But it also wouldn’t be the first partnership that failed due to perceived incompatibilities in organizational culture.  In fact, one of the great healthcare case studies in business school is about the ultimately failed merger of Stanford and UCLA health systems– a marriage that came apart after two years.  The cause, according to the Stanford Alumni Magazine?

The venture’s biggest downfall may have been that it never managed to bind the two institutions together with a common culture.

I’ve been thinking a lot about the concept of culture in healthcare.  You hear the term used frequently– generally to describe either some sort of social incompatibility between one group and another.  Besides mergers, the other time you hear the term used is to explain poor operational performance at healthcare organizations.   People in healthcare often finger “culture” as the explanation for a litany of disappointing outcomes, failed initiatives and poor performance.

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Building Healthy Communities 2.0

With its elegant homes, pleasant park and bustling stores, the Woodlawn section of Birmingham, Alabama was described in a 1950 news article as “a really great section of Birmingham…typical of the fine things in life.” Then came the racial unrest of the 1960s, disruption from urban renewal gone awry and white flight to Birmingham’s suburbs. Joblessness and poverty took root; the housing stock decayed. Today, median income in Woodlawn is just $21,000, less than half the level for Birmingham as a whole.But now Woodlawn is in the midst of a turnaround, aiming to become not just a neighborhood that prospers economically, but also one where people live healthier lives.

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Why Large Scale Government IT Projects Fail and What To Do About It

The volume of failed large-scale information technology (IT) projects in the public sector is troubling. These projects are failing at an alarming rate. The long history of public sector IT failures has seen billions of dollars lost, embarrassment, redundancy, waste, and a loss in public trust. In 2004, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) began work on the Expeditionary Combat Support System, a project designed to streamline and automate the USAF’s operations by consolidating over 200 legacy systems. The USAF contracted with Oracle and then Computer Sciences Corporation and by 2012, the project had spent $1.1 billion taxpayer dollars and was ultimately terminated. U.S. Senators Carl Levin and John McCain stated that this project was “one of the most egregious examples of mismanagement in recent memory.” The National Programme for IT in Great Britain has failed miserably after £12.7 billion was spent to create an online portal that would allow citizens access to their personal health information; the project will arrive four years late in 2015. In Victoria, Australia, a smartcard ticketing system for public transportation was started in 2005 and was flawed from conception. Eventually, the project was implemented years late, marred by various missteps, and went $500 million over budget.

Even though leaders are familiar with past failures, many in the public sector have failed to learn from these mistakes. Bent Flyvberg and his colleagues dubbed this phenomena the “megafailures paradox” where there is continued investment in IT projects while failing to understand the causes of failures.

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