One of the oddest aspects of the last six months has been the degree to which the Republican base has embraced symbolic (9-9-9) over substantive (Paul Ryan) positions on entitlement reform from the GOP Presidential field. Why is this happening? Over at Redstate.com, bastion of populist conservatism, Dan McLaughlin thinks he has the answer. But in fact, his essay answers a different question: why it is that conservative voters remain woefully unprepared to tackle the fiscal challenges ahead.
“There’s been a lot of talk,” Dan opens, “about the struggle between the GOP ‘Establishment’ and ‘Outsiders,’ sometimes—but sometimes not—meaning the Tea Party…it’s time to clarify the core issue that has people…scratching their heads at their own constituents.” So what is it that divides conservatives? Is it social issues? Knowledge of French? “The answer is a simple one: it’s almost entirely about spending.”
According to Dan, the divide between the Establishment and the Outsiders is their commitment to reducing government spending. “There is general philosophical agreement among both Republicans and conservatives about [the need to reduce spending]. Where the fault line lies is in exactly how far we are willing to go to do something about it.” According to Dan, the establishmentarian candidates are “the two Northeasterners,” Mitt Romney and Rick Santorum, with Rick Perry and Ron Paul as the outsiders and Newt Gingrich “in the middle.”
As he ascends to the Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Ron Wyden’s recent proposal to reform Medicare by improving care for the chronically ill has garnered significant attention and support. Its topline goal of incentivizing integration of care for high-risk patients is resonating with stakeholders across the health care continuum.
In light of its momentum and Senator Wyden’s imminently expanding authority over Federal healthcare programs, we thought it wise to take a closer look at his plan – the “Better Care, Lower Cost Act” (BCLA). What we found is more interesting, ambitious and – potentially – complex than the headlines suggest.
In essence, the BCLA would allow providers (and health plans) to form new entities – labeled Better Care Programs (BCPs) – that receive capitated payments for all Medicare-covered services delivered to their enrollees. The initiative would initially focus on regions of the country with disproportionately high rates of chronic illness and only medically complex patients would be allowed to enroll.
There are a variety of medical protocols that BCPs would be required to adopt, including development of personalized chronic care plans for each enrollee.
If you are hearing echoes of the Accountable Care “movement,” then you are in the right concert hall but listening to a very different symphony. While BCPs share some characteristics with ACOs, they would differ in important ways. A limited number of ACOs in Medicare currently take full(ish) financial risk, but all BCPs would do so, with some risk corridors instituted in the first few years.
Unlike most ACO programs, control groups would be established for purposes of measuring BCP performance. Also – and this is pivotal – BCPs would be required to proactively enroll Medicare beneficiaries, while patients are typically passively attributed to ACOs.
By taking a giant step down the shared savings path, which it travels alongside ACO programs, the BCLA further blurs the line between traditional fee for service and managed care. BCPs would actually be compensated in the same manner as Medicare Advantage plans, the private insurance option in Medicare.
Medicare reform thus far has been focused on $79 office visits, co-payments for home health care, hospital readmissions, Miami infusion clinics, the price paid for scooters, $45 resting EKG’s, the Plan B deductible, etc. These are important areas to pursue — but they are not where the real money is.
While we are debating the ‘doc fix’, the drug companies, device companies and hospitals are backing up the truck and cleaning out the store!
Consider the following paid claims paid by Medicare in Indiana in 2011:
113 Heart Transplants: average payment was $773,877 a piece
96 Bone Marrow Transplants: average payout was $509,637 apiece
129 Liver Transplants: average payout was $367,000 apiece
2,200 Tracheostomies: average payout was $376,103 apiece
1,517 Open Heart Surgeries: average payout was $185,000 apiece
Altogether, the 12,000 largest claims in one state totalled $2.4 billion in Medicare spending. If the other states are consistent, then large claims like these ate up $120 billion of Medicare’s total spending of $545 billion.And when you factor in sepsis treatments, defribillator-implants, and similar claims that cost “only” $75,000 each and so did not make the above list…….. then almost two-thirds of Medicare spending — over $300 billion a year — is focused on just ten percent of beneficiaries.
The evidence is building: As we move toward making the Affordable Care Act a reality, Medicare spending is slowing, and even in the private sector, for the first time in more than a decade, insurers are focusing on reining in health care costs.
The passage of reform legislation two years ago prompted a change in how both health care providers and payers think about care. The ACA told insurers that they would no longer be able to shun the sick by refusing to cover those suffering from pre-existing conditions. They also won’t be allowed to cap how much they will pay out to an desperately ill patient over the course of a year –or a lifetime. Perhaps most importantly, going forward, insurance companies selling policies to individuals and small companies will have to reimburse for all of the “essential benefits” outlined in the ACA–benefits that are not now covered by most policies. This means that, if they hope to stay in business, they will have to find a way to ”manage” the cost of care–but they won’t be able to do it by denying needed care.
As for providers, they, too, will be under pressure. A growing number will no longer be paid “fee for service” that rewards them for “volume”–i.e. “doing more.” Bonuses will depend on better outcomes, and keeping patients out of the hospital–which means doing a better job of managing chronic illnesses. Meanwhile, Medicare will be shaving 1% a year from annual increases in payments to hospitals. If medical centers want to stay in the black, they, too, will have to provide greater “value” for health care dollars– better outcomes at a lower cost.
This summer the Supreme Court’s decision sealed the deal. The ACA is constitutional. Health care reform is here to stay.
In my last blog I explained how at one time our nation’s healthcare budget was relatively small and our economy was robust, so that economic growth could accommodate rising health spending and still allow us to spend more on other goods and services. Today our healthcare budget is huge and growing, while our economy stagnates. Economic growth is barely enough to pay for rising healthcare spending, with little left over to buy more of anything else. In the next few blogs I will explore our options for cutting health spending. To the extent that economic theory and empirical evidence allows, I will also discuss the likely consequences. It should come as no surprise to say that all of these options entail some risks. But if we are to avoid putting all our eggs in the healthcare basket, then we must decide which risks are worth taking.
A simple fact of accounting guides my analysis: If we want to spend less money on medical services, then we either (a) pay lower prices for the services we buy, (b) substitute away from high price services in favor of lower priced alternatives, or (c) purchase fewer services. There are no other options. Moreover, we can do these things either by government fiat or through markets and incentives. In this blog I explore options (a) and (b), mainly focusing on Medicare.
The Affordable Care Act calls for substantial reductions in Medicare fees, providing the largest anticipated cost savings in the ACA. (Private insurers relied on market forces to reduce provider fees in the 1990s, only to see providers gain the upper hand and sharply increase fees in the 2000s.) It is clear that the federal government has the power to reduce Medicare fees, but should it? What are the consequences?
I didn’t vote for Barack Obama. But like a lot of Americans, I was hopeful about his presidency.
Just as it took a Republican to thaw our relationship with China, it will probably take a Democrat to reform our entitlement programs. Again and again, Obama promised to step up to the challenge. Then he left the country at the altar and pursued partisan politics instead.
Bill Clinton was going to be the first Democratic president to tackle entitlement spending. Although the effort has been completely ignored by the establishment media, Clinton was planning historic reforms during his second term. These were to include private accounts under Social Security and vouchers for Medicare.
If that doesn’t knock your socks off, you haven’t been paying attention. When Republicans propose these things, Democrats invariably claim the GOP is trying to destroy the social safety net and leave the elderly to fend for themselves.
Clinton was serious. He had his Treasury Department draw up detailed plans. In fact, when Pat Moynihan, the colorful intellectual senator from New York, was appointed by President George W. Bush to co-chair the Social Security reform commission, the first thing he did was ask the Treasury to send him the Clinton-era planning documents so that the commission could continue where Clinton’s policy team left off.
So what derailed Bill Clinton’s ambitious reform agenda? Monica Lewinsky. Left wing Democrats in Congress threatened to throw him under the bus in the impeachment proceedings unless he completely dropped the reform ideas they regarded as heresy. Unfortunately for the country, he obliged.
Presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s reform plan for Medicare is just as cautious―and carefully vague on some key details―as might be expected from an politician famously sensitive to the winds of public opinion.
Romney’s proposal looks a lot like those offered by last year’s Rivlin-Domenici Debt Reduction Task Force and the 1999 National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare. Like those proposals, and also the plan offered by House Budget Chair Paul Ryan, Romney’s would convert Medicare into a premium support program in which beneficiaries would receive a fixed contribution towards the cost of coverage. However, unlike Ryan’s plan―received so negatively by seniors that it cost Republicans a House seat―beneficiaries would still have traditional fee-for-service Medicare as an option.
Under the Romney proposal, commercial insurers would compete with traditional Medicare in offering a basic set of benefits. Beneficiaries would choose from a “menu” of plans, paying out-of-pocket for any difference between the premium and the federal support contribution. Lower-income individuals would receive larger premium support amounts, while beneficiaries selecting options with premiums below the support amount would keep the savings. Also, as with the other similar proposals, there would be a gradual increase in the Medicare eligibility age from today’s 65 years.
Although it was immediately attacked by various liberal commentators, the Romney proposal seems on the surface to be a reasonable approach to a program that otherwise is headed for bankruptcy. How reasonable, however, will depend on numerous details that have been carefully left vague. (Interestingly, the proposal is nowhere mentioned on candidate Romney’s campaign web site.)
In an ideal world, all our doctors would have the wisdom of Marcus Welby, and all our nurses the compassion of Florence Nightingale. This medical world would be populated with doctors who all graduated No. 1 in their classes, who perform only necessary surgery — and without complications. These doctors would always wash their hands between patients to minimize the spread of infection. All medical research would be funded by nonprofit foundations to preclude bias. And, of course, all doctors would be salaried to avoid perverse incentives to do too much to too many.
Recently, the United States Preventive Services Task Force recommended against prostate-cancer screening, saying it doesn’t save lives overall and often leads to additional tests or treatments that do harm. Two years ago, the same task force, which is made up of nonfederal experts in primary care, recommended against screening mammography for women in their 40s.
What would Dr. Welby and Nurse Nightingale have said about the task force recommendations? I believe they would have endorsed them, because they are carefully researched and objective.
Yet both recommendations have been met with widespread protest. The task force has been accused of rationing — the dirtiest word in American medicine.
Why? Because a chasm separates the idealized world of American medical practice and our current reality.
I am a physician who has been studying Medicare data throughout my professional life. But now that I’m closing in on becoming a beneficiary, I am thinking more about what I’d like my Medicare program to look like.
My Medicare would be guided by three basic principles:
It should not bankrupt our children. Let’s be clear: Medicare is rightly the central source of concern in the deficit debate. Its expenditures are totally out of control, and represent a huge income transfer to the elderly from their children. It’s a program crying out for a budget.
So let’s pick a number — more specifically, a proportion of total economic output — to cap Medicare. Now the number is 3% to 4% of GDP. We can live with that. Distribute it to geographic regions based simply on how many beneficiaries live there. Expect howls of protest: Urban areas will complain their labor costs are higher; rural areas will complain they cannot achieve the same economies of scale. And everybody will argue that their patients are sicker.
Ignore them all: Make it a block-grant program. Sure, this raises other issues, but you get the principle.
For those who view this as a tea party solution, consider this: I drive a 1999 Volvo and live in Vermont — that should tell you something.
It should not waste money on low-yield medicine. I don’t change my Volvo’s oil every 1,500 miles, even though some mechanics might argue that it would be better for its engine. Nor do I buy new tires every 10,000 miles, even though doing so would arguably make my car safer. But in Medicare (as well as the rest of U.S. medical care) such low-yield interventions are routine.
In a speech at the Hoover Institution today, Representative Paul Ryan (R-WI) argued again that his proposal to reform Medicare, and now his tax credit proposal for replacing the Democratic health care law for those under-age 65, would guarantee to citizens “options like the ones members of Congress enjoy.”
His proposals would not give people the guarantees members of Congress, and all other federal employees for that matter, now enjoy.
This is not a small point.
Previously on this blog, I have argued that many of the defined contribution reform proposals, Ryan’s included, should be faulted for putting all of the future risk of health care costs on beneficiaries.
Ryan’s Medicare plan would create a premium support system for seniors. The premium support amount would increase each year by the rate of basic inflation, even though health care costs have historically increased much faster. Seniors would then take this premium support payment to the market and buy their own private health insurance policy. Another recent Medicare reform proposal by the health care industry would increase a similar health care premium support payment each year by the rate of increase in the gross domestic product (GDP) +1%.
In both cases, neither insurers nor health care providers would have any of the risk, and therefore responsibility, for keeping costs under control. The entire burden for the adequacy of these premium support payments would be with the beneficiary. If health care costs rose faster than these premium supports, tied to these indexes that have always trailed health care inflation, too bad for the beneficiary. Any excess cost is borne by the individual.