Almost immediately after the House vote on Sunday, the media switched its “horse race” coverage from analyzing the politics of the affair to what it characterized as a clash of economic classes. Analysts were often quick to suggest that the average American might find himself in the loser column. Others offered the conventional ”on the one hand, on the other hand” pseudo-journalism, probably leaving most to assume (not unreasonably, based on their experience under trickle-down economics) that they have little to gain. And inevitably, confusion spawns cynicism: The first question on Monday from my 91 year old uncle was: ”Do I still have Medicare?”Continue reading…
In his closing remarks to the Senate Finance Committee last week, Senator Baucus pointed with special pride to the effect the Committee’s reform bill will have on shaping the health care system in the longer run:
One point I want to make… is about delivery system reform. We are starting here in this bill to finally reform our delivery system so it’s based much more on quality and patient focus, moving ever so slowly, but inexorably, from fee for service….which causes a lot of the waste in our system. We’re not going to see savings, the benefits, to the system for a while… but after four, five, six years from now, we’re going to see the real benefits of reform.Continue reading…
Here’s a pop quiz on health reform: Which prominent Republican said the following:
And if you don’t [oppose this health care legislation] and if I don’t do it, one of these days you and I are going to spend our sunset years telling our children, and our children’s children, what it once was like in America when men were free.
OK, it’s a trick question: the answer is Ronald Reagan, paid spokesman for the American Medical Association’s Women’s Auxiliary, speaking in 1961 against the bill that ultimately emerged as Medicare. (A recording of his “coffee klatch” talk, “Ronald Reagan Speaks Out Against Socialized Medicine,” is here.
Although what political scientist Jonathan Oberlander has termed “a politics of consensus” lasted for some thirty years after Medicare’s enactment, bipartisanship broke down in 1995 when Newt Gingrich targeted Medicare for cuts of 30% and urged privatization using managed care. By the lights of conservative Republicans, severe cuts in traditional Medicare would encourage flight to managed care alternatives, so that, in the famous phrase of Newt Gingrich, Medicare would “wither on the vine.” (1 St. Louis U.J. Health L. & Pol’y 5-43 (2007), Abstract). Although President Clinton used the Republicans’ Medicare reform to his own benefit (polls showed that his defense of Medicare helped him secure re-election), ultimately much of the Republicans’ agenda for reform was adopted in 2003. Since then Republicans have not relented in their criticism of the program– with some in leadership positions even questioning the government’s role in health care for seniors. (See Rachel Maddow’s cable television show featuring a parade of video clips of Republicans bashing Medicare, including former Speaker DeLay –echoed by Representative Roy Blunt–asserting that “Medicare shouldn’t be a government program”).
The idea of establishing regional cooperatives, advanced as an alternative to President Obama’s public plan option, has attracted attention as a means of assuring that health reform legislation contains some means to improve competition among health plans around the nation. But the proposal, which may have superficial appeal as a “middle ground” between a public plan option and an unchecked private market, is ill-equipped to fix the key problems a public plan would address. In addition, recent experience teaches that timely and effective entry by such plans is unlikely.
The first issue is whether a cooperative, organized by consumers or other groups, can effectively deal with the shortcomings of the existing delivery system and insurance market. Thus far, the proposal advanced by Senator Conrad is pretty sketchy, but are grounds for skepticism. A central reason for having government sponsored plans is to allow the efficiencies of Medicare’s well-established administrative structure and innovative payment experiments to carry over to the private sector. Coops provide no such advantage. A second advantage of public plans is that they would likely achieve some bargaining leverage by virtue of their probable role as insurer for people representing higher risks whom private insurers find some methods to avoid. Hospitals and physicians will be hard pressed to bypass such a significant presence in the market and the public plan can thereby exert market-wide pressure to keep provider and pharmaceutical costs down. Whether co-ops will be willing to undertake the role of covering such individuals or able to sponsor innovative delivery systems to treat them is far from certain.
In any event, it is hard to envision numerous regional coops gathering the necessary data, experience and reputation to serve as a benchmark or counterweight to dominant hospitals and provider groups across the country. Further, there is a serious question regarding the independence and mission of coops. It is a mistake to assume that nonprofit entities will necessarily work to the advantage of the public. Unfortunately, our experience with nonprofit hospitals and HMOs suggest that they can easily be persuaded to play along with other providers and may not always vigorously pursue their charitable mission. Keeping cooperatives’ eye on the ball would require close attention to the control and governance of such entities.
The second objection is based on timing and practical considerations. There is ample evidence from our experience with health insurance markets that developing effective coop-sponsored plans will not come easily or quickly. It is clear that new entrants into health insurance markets face a host of obstacles. The prevalence and magnitude of entry barriers is evidenced by the dominance and profitability of existing insurance plans. One or a handful of companies dominate most health insurance markets around the country and these firms have enjoyed consistent and robust profits. Economic theory would suggest that such profit opportunities should have invited entry by rivals eager to capture some of the profits available in those markets.
Additional proof of the obstacles to entry are found in the investigations by insurance commissioners into proposed mergers in their states. In Pennsylvania for example, the proposed merger of Highmark and Independence Blue Cross would have combined the dominant insurers in two large distinct geographic regions of the state. Evidence provided to the State indicated that numerous attempts by regional and national firms such as Aetna and Coventry to enter both markets had proved unsuccessful over the years. Expert studies suggested that a variety of factors including brand loyalty, difficulties in securing physician and hospital network contracts, regulatory and information gathering costs, and obstacles created by the contracting practices of incumbent providers, thwarted entry. Newly formed coops needing to acquire expertise and develop networks will surely face enormous difficulties penetrating markets.
Professor Greaney’s is a nationally recognized expert on health care law and the Chester A. Myers Professor of Lawand the Director, Center for Health Law Studies, St. Louis University School of Law. Thomas Greaney has spent the last two decades examining the evolution of the health care industry. He is also a frequent contributor at Health Reform Watch where this post first appeared. His recent testimony to the Senate on “Competition in the Health Care Marketplace” may be found here.