Managed care advocates see quality problems everywhere and resource shortages nowhere. If the Leapfrog Group, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, or some other managed care advocate were in charge of explaining why a high school football team lost to the New England Patriots, their explanation would be “poor quality.”
If a man armed with a knife lost a fight to a man with a gun, ditto: “Poor quality.” And their solution would be more measurement of the “quality,” followed by punishment of the losers for getting low grades on the “quality” report card and rewards for the winners. The obvious problem – a mismatch in resources – and the damage done to the losers by punishing them would be studiously ignored.
This widespread, willful blindness to the role that resource disparities play in creating ethnic and income disparities and other problems, and the concomitant widespread belief that all defects in the US health care system are due to insufficient “quality,” is difficult to explain. I will attempt to lay out the rudiments of an explanation in this essay.
In my first article in this two-part series, I presented evidence demonstrating that “pay-for-performance” (P4P) and “value-base purchasing” (VBP) (rewarding and punishing providers based on crude measures of cost and quality) punish providers who treat a disproportionate share of the poor and the sick.
Recently, the New York Times published an article on excessive costs incurred by mid-level providers over-treating benign skin lesions. According to the piece, more than 15% of biopsies billed to Medicare in 2015 were done by unsupervised PA’s or Nurse Practitioners. Physicians across the country are becoming concerned mid-levels working independently without proper specialty training. Dr. Coldiron, a dermatologist, was interviewed by the Times and said, “What’s really going on is these practices…hire a bunch of P.A.’s and nurses and stick them out in clinics on their own. And they’re acting like doctors.”
They are working “like” doctors, yet do not have training equivalent to physicians. As a pediatrician, I have written about a missed diagnosis of an infant by an unscrupulous midlevel provider who embellished his pediatric expertise. This past summer, astute physician colleagues came across an independent physician assistant, Christie Kidd, PA-C, boldly referring to herself as a “dermatologist.” Her receptionist answers the phone by saying “Kidd Dermatology.”
The Doctors, a daytime talk show, accurately referred to Ms. Kidd on a May 7, 2015 segment as a “skin care specialist.” However, beauty magazines are not held to the same high standard; the dailymail.com, a publication in the UK, captioned a picture of “Dr. Christie Kidd”, as the “go-to MD practicing in Beverly Hills.”
The article shared how Ms. Kidd treats the Kardashian-Jenner family, “helping them to look luminous in their no-make-up selfies.”
On Wednesday, October 25, 2017 I was at the inaugural Society for Participatory Medicine conference. It was a fantastic day and the ending keynote was the superb Shannon Brownlee. It was great to catch up with her and I’m grateful that she agreed to let THCB publish her speech. Settle back with a cup of coffee (or as it’s Thanksgiving, perhaps something stronger), and enjoy–Matthew Holt
George Burns once said, the secret to a good sermon is to have a good beginning and a good ending—and to have the two as close together as possible. I think the same is true of final keynotes after a fantastic conference. So I will do my best to begin and end well, and keep the middle to a minimum.
I have two main goals today. First, I want to praise the work you are doing, and set it into a wider context of the radical transformation of health care that has to happen if we want to achieve a system that is accountable to patients and communities, affordable, effective — and universal: everybody in, nobody out.
My second goal is to recruit you. I’m the co-founder of the Right Care Alliance, which is a grassroots movement of patients, doctors, nurses, community organizers dedicated to bringing about a better health system. We have 11 councils and chapters formed or forming in half a dozen cities. I would like nothing more than at the end of this talk, for every one of you to go to www.rightcarealliance.org and sign up.
But first, I want to tell you a bit about why I’m here and what radicalized me. My father, Mick Brownlee, died three years ago this Thanksgiving, and through his various ailments over the course of the previous 30 years, I’ve seen the best of medicine, and the worst.
My father was a sculptor and a scholar, but he was also a stoic, so when he began suffering debilitating headaches in his early 50s, he ignored them, until my stepmother saw him stagger and fall against a wall in the kitchen, clutching his head. She took him to the local emergency room, at a small community hospital in eastern Oregon. This was the 1970s, and the hospital had just bought a new fangled machine—a CT scanner, which showed a mass just behind his left ear. It would turn out to be a very slow growing cancer, a meningioma, that was successfully removed, thanks to the wonders of CT and brain surgery. What a miracle!
Fast forward 15 years, and Mick was prescribed a statin drug for his slightly elevated cholesterol. One day, he was fine. The next he wasn’t, not because his cholesterol had changed, but the cutoff point for statin recommendations had been lowered. Not long after Mick began taking the statin, he began feeling tired and suffering mild chest pain, which was written of as angina. What we didn’t know at the time was the statin was causing his body to destroy his muscles, a side effect called rhabdomyolysis. Even his doctor didn’t recognize his symptoms, because back then, the drug companies hid how often patients suffered this side effect.
The statin caught up with Mick at an exhibit in Seattle of Chinese bronzes, ancient bells and other sculptures that my father had been studying in art books his whole career. Halfway through the exhibit, he told my brother to take him home; he was too tired to take another step.
Three days later, he was in the hospital on dialysis. The rhabdomyolysis had finally begun to destroy his kidneys. Three weeks later, he was sent home alive with one kidney barely functional. Soon his health would begin to deteriorate at a steady pace.Continue reading…
On November 15, 2017, an epidemic of hypertension broke out and could rapidly affect tens of millions of Americans. The epicenter of the outbreak was traced back to the meeting of the American Heart Association in Anaheim, CA.
The pathogen was released in a special 488-page document labeled “Hypertension Guidelines.” The document’s suspicious content was apparently noted by meeting personnel, but initial attempts to contain it with an embargo failed and the virus was leaked to the press. Within minutes, the entire healthcare ecosystem was contaminated.
At this point, strong measures are necessary to stem the epidemic. Everyone is advised not to click on any document or any link connected to this virus. Instead, we are offering the following code that will serve both as a decoy and as an antidote for the virulent trojan horse.
Only a strong dose of common sense packed in a few lines of text can possibly save us from an otherwise lethal epidemic of nonsense. Please save the following text on your EHR cloud or hard-drive, commit it to memory or to a dot phrase, and copy and paste it on all relevant quality and pay-for-performance reports you are asked to submit.
Baseball, like medicine, is deeply imbued with a sense of tradition, and no team more so than the New York Yankees, disdainful of innovations like placing players’ names on the backs of their jerseys and resistant to eroding strict standards related to haircuts and beards.
It’s why doctors and patients alike should pay special attention to why the Yankees parted ways with their old manager and what they now seek instead. In a word: “collaboration.”
That’s the takeaway from a recent New York Times article examining why the Yankees declined to re-sign manager Joe Girardi despite his stellar “outcomes” (to use a medical term); i.e., the best record in baseball during his 10 years at the Yankees’ helm. But Yankees executives believe the game has changed. The model for future success is the Los Angeles Dodgers, the tradition- and cash-rich franchise on the opposite coast that went to this year’s World Series while the Yankees sat home.
The new way to win? According to Dodgers executives, it requires a combination of statistical analysis, shared decisions and communication between and among all stakeholders based on collaborative relationships.
A strange thing happened last year in some the nation’s most established hospitals and health systems. Hundreds of millions of dollars in income suddenly disappeared.
This article examines the economic struggles of inpatient facilities, the even harsher realities in front of them, and why hospitals are likely to aggravate, not address, healthcare’s rising cost issues.
According to the Harvard Business Review, several big-name hospitals reported significant declines and, in some cases, net losses to their FY 2016 operating margins. Among them, Partners HealthCare, New England’s largest hospital network, lost $108 million; the Cleveland Clinic witnessed a 71% decline in operating income; and MD Anderson, the nation’s largest cancer center, dropped $266 million.
How did some of the biggest brands in care delivery lose this much money? The problem isn’t declining revenue. Since 2009, hospitals have accounted for half of the $240 billion spending increase among private U.S. insurers. It’s not that increased competition is driving price wars, either. On the contrary, 1,412 hospitals have merged since 1998, primarily to increase their clout with insurers and raise prices. Nor is it a consequence of people needing less medical care. The prevalence chronic illness continues to escalate, accounting for 75% of U.S. healthcare costs, according to the CDC.
The managed care movement thrives on misleading words and phrases. Perhaps the worst example is the incessant use of the word “quality” to characterize a problem that has multiple causes, only one of which might be inferior physician or hospital quality.  To illustrate with a non-medical analogy, no one would blame auto repair mechanics if 50 percent of their customers failed to bring their cars in for regular oil changes. We would attribute the underuse of mechanics’ services to forces far beyond the mechanic’s control and would not, therefore, refer to the problem as a “quality” problem.
But over the last three decades it has become acceptable among American health policy experts and policy-makers to characterize any measurement of under- or over-use of medical care, or any measurement of a medical outcome, no matter how poorly adjusted to reflect factors outside provider control, as an indication of “quality.” The widespread, inappropriate use of “quality” long ago set off a vicious cycle. It helped spread the folklore that the quality of America’s doctors and hospitals is awful, and that in turn was used to justify taking even more crude measurements of quality, and so on. Continue reading…
The Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP), or Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), continue to be CMS’ flagship pay for performance (P4P) model delivering care via 432 MSSP ACOs located in every state to over nine million, or 16%, of Medicare beneficiaries. This year the agency did not announce 2016 performance year results. Instead, CMS posted without notice in late October a Public Use File (PUF) or spread sheet summarizing 2016 performance. What analysis CMS did provide was by CMS’ vendor, the Research Triangle Institute (RTI), several weeks ago to ACO participants via webinar. RTI’s slides are not made publicly available.
Like performance year one (2013), two (2014), and three (2015), performance year four (2016) once again produced limited positive results. As stated last year, CMS does not evaluate the ACO program, therefore, ACO participants and Medicare policy analysts are left to decipher how success was achieved, what performance results mean for the MSSP program and in context of the agency’s overall efforts to reduce Medicare spending growth.
2016 ACO Financial Performance Results
Here is a bulleted summary of 2016 financial performance based on the PUF and RTI’s slides.
In 2016 there were 432 ACOs that had their performance year results reconciled.
Of these, 410 were Track 1, six were Track 2 and 16 were Track 3.
Of the 432, 134 earned shared savings or 119 out of 410 Track 1s, six out of six Track 2s earned shared savings and nine out of 16 Track 3s earned shared savings. Four Track 3 ACOs owed $9.33 million in shared losses. Only 129 actually received shared savings checks because five of the 134 owed CMS for advanced ACO payments.
Physician only ACOs once again were more successful than ACOs that included a hospital, or 41% versus 23% respectively.
Also again longer tenured ACOs were more successful. Among the 2012-2013 ACO class 42% were successful compared to 18% of the 2016 starters.
The 134 2016 ACOs earned in sum slightly more than $700 million in shared savings. Actual savings paid out was close to $650 million because imperfect quality caused ACOs to leave money on the table and because of Medicare reimbursement or sequestration cuts required the 2011 Budget Control Act.
For 2016 30% of participation MSSP ACOs will receive a shared savings check compared to 29% in 2016, 26% in 2015 and 27% in 2014.
Earned shared savings were again highly concentrated. The 15 highest performing ACOs received $265 million total in shared savings as compared to the 15 lowest performing shared savings ACOs that received $20 million in total. An August DHHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) report made note of this dynamic, i.e., about half of the spending reductions during the first three years of the program, or $1.7 billion, were generated by 36 ACOs and three ACOs in that group generated a quarter of the amount.
Of the remaining 294 2016 ACOs, 107 fell within their positive Minimum Loss Ratio (MLR) corridor, 105 fell within their negative MLR corridor and 82 fell outside their negative MLR corridor. This last group, the worst performing ACOs, was 19% of all 2016 ACOs, significantly less than the 24% of the worse performing 2015 ACOs.
Again, success was largely determined by an ACO’s financial benchmark. ACOs that earned shared savings in 2016 had a reconciled benchmark 10% higher than all other ACOs, or respectively $11,614 per beneficiary versus $10,563 per beneficiary, or a benchmark 7% higher than those within their positive MLR corridor and 12% higher than those that fell below their negative MLR. The OIG report reached the same conclusion. During the first three years of the program, ACOs that received shared savings had a $11,748 per beneficiary benchmark compared to a $10,284 per beneficiary for ACOs that did not receive shared savings, a 12% difference. As noted last year, because of this successful ACOs only had to comparatively spend a trivial amount less than their financial benchmark to be successful.
The opioid crisis has been upon us for years now, and we are now seeing the problem become more pervasive, with more than 90 deaths per day in the U.S. due to this scourge. The president recently said he would be declaring a public health emergency (which would free up some funds) but has not done so as of this writing. The public health threat is so persistent that it calls for responses on many levels, and those responses are coming. Some have been in place for a while, some are more recent. These responses may be broken down into a number of different categories:
States imposing limits on prescribing and dispensing, mandating education and other innovations (for example, Massachusetts’ first-in-the nation opioids law (including the first state law limiting most opioid prescriptions to a seven-day supply), enacted in 2015, with a follow-up law enacted in 2016 that among other things offers a system for recording and communicating a voluntary opiate “opt-out” for individuals); and limiting pharma payments to physicians in order to discourage incentives for high-prescriber status (current proposal in New Jersey)
Licensure and certification bodies imposing limits on prescribing and dispensing (state boards of registration in medicine, e.g., Ohio) and articulating management and operations frameworks for implementing those limits (Joint Commission)
The overarching goal is to eliminate the use of opiates for all but the most critical short-term needs (limiting prescriptions to a seven-day supply) and medically-appropriate chronic and palliative pain management. There are alternative pain relief drugs — and a wide variety of other treatments for pain, ranging from TENS to meditation to VR. Taken together, the initiatives highlighted and linked to above represent a good start. Of course, we need more than a good start, as the US consumes a wildly disproportionate share of opiates compared to other countries — follow link for some facts and figures — for predictable reasons of economics, politics and culture, and we are paying a staggering price in excess morbidity and mortality and in secondary effects (the effects on family and community).
Many people have been surprised by the announcement that CVS is interested in purchasing Aetna. Why would a PBM want to own a health plan? There has been speculation that the move by Amazon to get into the pharmacy space may be a reason. But there is another more rationale reason and its based upon a flaw in the Affordable Care Act.
The flaw is known as the Medical Loss Ratio requirement and it reads like this from the CMS website
The Affordable Care Act requires insurance companies to spend at least 80% or 85% of premium dollars on medical care, with the rate review provisions imposing tighter limits on health insurance rate increases. If an issuer fails to meet the applicable MLR standard in any given year, as of 2012, the issuer is required to provide a rebate to its customers.
This requirement was put in place as a way to ensure that health plans did not make money by underutilizing medical care. But it had the unintended consequence of insuring that costs never went down and here’s why.